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N O T E 
The Pound referred to in this study is the East African Pound, 
and is equivalent to $2.80. It used to be at par with the British 
Pound before devaluation of the latter in November, 1967. 
In 1964 the Republic of Tanzania was formed as a result of a 
union between Tanganyika and Zanzibar. Statistics in this study 
refer to Mainland Tanzania only, and, in order to avoid confusion, 
I have used the term Tanganyika in all references to Mainland 
Tanzania. 
P R E F A C E 
Due to various unforeseen circumstances the gestation period 
of this study has been longer than was anticipated in 1965. A study 
of this kind benefits greatly from every new report or statistic 
published on agriculture, and the temptation to incorporate such 
material necessarily delays publication. But at some stage the 
advantages of sounding up-to-date must be balanced against the 
disadvantages arising from the fact that some of the original state-
ments may have become out-dated with the passage of time. One 
must also think of the opportunity cost of revising an existing study 
in terms of the returns to be obtained from embarking on, an 
entirely new one. These factors have influenced the timing of this 
publication. 
I embarked on this study when I was a Research Fellow at the 
East African Institute of Social Research (now the Makerere Institute 
of Social Research). I benefited greatly from my membership of the 
Economic Development Research Project, and I would like to 
record my gratitude for the contribution members of that group 
made to the formulation of this study. Special mention should be 
made of Professor Paul G. Clark who, as Director of the Economic 
Development Research Project, stimulated my interest in the 
problems discussed in this study, and later gave his time ungrudgingly 
in reading over earlier drafts of the study. Professor W. T. Newlyn 
and Mr. Deryke Belshaw read later drafts of the study and made 
extremely useful suggestions. I am of course responsible for any 
remaining shortcomings. 
Lastly, I wish to express my gratitude to my wife, Estella, whose 
loneliness after a serious operation in 1966 was part of the price 
paid in the revision of various drafts of this study. Her constant 
enquiries about the state of 'the monograph' has done a lot to 
shake me out of inaction. This book is dedicated to her. 
Department of Economics Yoeri Kyesimira 
Makerere University College 
July, 1968 
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INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY 
It is now a widely held hypothesis that whatever structural changes 
could be envisaged for the economies of East Africa the develop-
ment of the agricultural sector will be of crucial importance in 
determining the overall development of these economies. For 
one thing the ability to carry through these contemplated changes— 
namely industrialising the economy—will itself be dependent, 
in large part, on the rate at which the agricultural sector progresses. 
The commonly observed phenomenon that as development proceeds 
the contribution of the agricultural sector to national income tends 
to fall does not arise from the stagnation of this sector: the structural 
change is largely explained by the fact that other sectors have 
a higher rate of growth than agriculture. The sheer size of agriculture 
in the economy at lower levels of development would indicate 
that its stagnation would virtually mean stagnation for the whole 
economy. Moreover, in the short run, agriculture is also the chief 
source of income for the majority of the population, so that short-
and medium-term schemes to improve the living standards of the 
masses will have to concern themselves with improving productivity 
in this sector. In this study only one aspect of this sector—namely 
agricultural exports—is treated. 
The importance of agricultural exports in the economies of 
East Africa is examined in the next chapter under three broad 
headings. Twelve major agricultural commodities exported from 
East Africa are taken to represent agricultural exports, and their 
contribution to the total value of exports is the first thing to be 
examined. It is found that these twelve commodities constitute 
about 80 per cent of East Africa's total value of exports, and that 
their importance since 1949 has not, in this respect, fallen. Uganda 
is found to be the most dependent of the three countries on the 
export of these commodities, while Tanganyika is the least depend-
ent of the three*. Over the whole period 1949 to 1966, Tanganyika 
has somewhat decreased her dependence on these commodities 
whereas Kenya has become more dependent on their export. 
* Tanganyika exports significant quantities of minerals, mainly diamonds. 
2 Introduction and summary 
The second aspect of agricultural exports examined in Chapter 2 
is their contribution to capital formation in East Africa. No direct 
link of any significance can be found between the level of public 
capital formation and agricultural exports in Kenya and Tanganyika, 
but in Uganda this link has been strong because of the more 
extensive use of export taxes to finance projects in the public sector 
and because resort has been had to funds accumulated in the price 
assistance funds, for financing capital projects and aiding certain 
groups in the economy in their development efforts. For lack of 
reliable statistics the direct contribution of agricultural exports 
to capital formation in the private sector is not examined, but 
some a priori evidence is adduced to support the view that its 
contribution must be considerable. 
Agricultural exports also contribute indirectly to private capital 
formation because they affect levels of income in East Africa. 
This is the portion of investment which is induced because of farmers' 
consumption expenditure as a result of rising incomes from the 
sale of their crops abroad. In particular a large proportion of this 
investment will be undertaken in non-agricultural activities, such 
as light consumer goods industries, and to this extent agricultural 
exports affect the pace of industrialisation in East Africa. Because 
of the great emphasis in all East African plans on industrialisation 
this latter aspect of agricultural exports is crucial for the purposes 
of achieving structural change in these economies. Accordingly, 
the third heading under which agricultural exports are discussed 
in Chapter 2 is their importance in determining the level of demand 
for non-agricultural output. 
The third chapter discusses the trends in agricultural exports 
for the whole period 1949 to 1966. In many respects this is a very 
interesting period because it covers the period before the Korean 
War boom, but carries the story through the time when prices 
dropped significantly from their high level after the boom to a time 
when they have been very low indeed. This fall in prices greatly 
reduced the value of agricultural exports in spite of the remark-
able increases in volume achieved between 1949 and 1962/63. 
These price declines hit Uganda's exports hardest, mainly because 
of the restricted range of her exports; but also because the increase 
in volume of her agricultural exports was the lowest of the three 
countries. This combination of factors gave rise to a considerably 
larger fall in the value of her total exports, until the upsurge of 
1963, than in the other two countries. 
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Chapter 4 combines the analysis of the foregoing chapters 
with that of official publications, particularly those of the Food 
and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, to give some 
qualified indications of the future course of prices for certain 
commodities considered a "good bet" for East Africa. The inherent 
difficulties of projecting prices in the future apart, one obstacle 
to this approach has to be recognised. This is that individual 
countries in East Africa may do well for themselves by picking 
those commodities whose future price outlook seems promising, 
but if most of the other countries follow suit then the market 
outlook would turn out to be gloomy. The example of tea is pointed 
out. But in a world where many countries are producing the same 
commodity with little reference to each other, it is not surprising 
that such a situation should arise. This, however, points to the need 
for using more extensively world market price intelligence and for 
cooperation between primary producing countries. 
This is, in fact, the subject of the last chapter which discusses 
the strategy which should be employed in maintaining and expand-
ing the level of export earnings. Some of the measures are national, 
and are characterised under two headings. These are firstly, the 
necessity of increasing the volume of exports, and secondly the 
need for some form of diversification of agricultural exports. 
The first strategy ensures that, given an unchanged level of prices, 
export earnings can be increased by increasing volume; alternatively, 
that in the face of falling prices, export earnings can be maintained 
and perhaps even increased if increases in volume of exports more 
than offset the effect of falling prices. The second strategy is intended 
to reduce the risk of price declines by diversifying the range of 
agricultural exports. International measures touched on in this 
study are those relating to international commodity agreements 
and compensation schemes. 
2 
THE IMPORTANCE OF AGRICULTURAL EXPORTS IN 
EAST AFRICA 
The contribution of agriculture to economic development has 
been analysed under five major headings by Bruce F. Johnston 
and John W. Mellor1. They stated that agriculture acts as a source 
of food; it acts as a source of labour for the non-farm sector; it 
provides foreign exchange; it provides capital; and lastly it provides 
a market for the commodities of the non-farm sector. The first 
two contributions of agriculture to development do not directly 
concern agricultural exports: except that if a country could increase 
very fast the export of a non-food crop in which it has got a sub-
stantial comparative economic advantage it could thereby purchase 
food and labour f rom outside, thus making these scarce commodities 
available to the economy. However, the importance of agricultural 
exports to the East African economies does not lie in this direction, 
and their importance in this chapter will be discussed mainly 
in relation to the last three functions. 
I Agricultural exports as a source of foreign exchange 
From the standpoint of economic planning and development the 
importance of export earnings is that imports of capital equipment 
required for development are dependent on the total value of exports, 
in the absence of large foreign exchange reserves or foreign aid. 
In these circumstances a shortage of foreign exchange arising out 
of a fall in export proceeds would force a developing country 
to adopt measures which are designed to preserve foreign exchange 
by restricting imports of those consumer goods which are consider-
ed luxuries: failure to make such a bold move would most certainly 
compromise the development effort. It becomes important, therefore, 
to analyse very carefully the constituent elements of which total 
exports are composed. The present section discusses the contri-
bution of agricultural exports to the export earnings of East Africa. 
For the purposes of this exercise twelve major crops were selected 
to represent agricultural exports. These were chosen either because 
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they represented large export values, such as sisal in Kenya and 
Tanganyika or coffee in Uganda and Kenya; or those which showed 
promise of becoming important exports in the near future as a 
way of diversifying East Africa's exports. Statistics were then 
compiled to show: (1) the average value of each of these commodities 
for the period 1960-62; (2) the importance of each commodity 
in the export earnings of East Africa as a whole (Table II :4); and 
(3) the importance of each of these commodities in the exports 
of each country was calculated, and the results are shown in Table 
II. 5. The crops selected were: cotton, sisal, arabica coffee, robusta 
coffee, tea, meat and meat preparations, hides and skins, pyrethrum 
(flowers lumped together with extract), cashew nuts, groundnuts 
(peanuts), wattle bark and extract, and unmilled maize. Unless 
otherwise stated the term agricultural exports in this study will 
be used to refer to only these twelve commodities. 
Before looking at the figures it should be made clear that in all 
cases exports relate to exports to countries outside East Africa 
from each country and to the sum of these for East Africa as a 
whole. Inter-country exports within East Africa are thus excluded. 
The figures also exclude re-exports. With the exception of maize 
in certain years, and animal products, neither exclusion is significant. 
From Table II.4 it is clear that more than three-quarters of 
East Africa's exports was contributed by these twelve commodities 
for the period under consideration. The dependence of developing 
countries on the export of agricultural commodities is only too 
familiar, and in this respect East Africa is no exception. As a matter 
of fact there are really three crops on which East Africa is heavily 
dependent: namely, cotton, sisal and coffee (if we combine robusta 
and arabica coffee together). These three crops contribute nearly 
60 per cent to East Africa's total exports, with both types of coffee 
contributing 27 per cent, cotton 17 per cent and sisal 15.3 per cent. 
These are the crops which are extremely vital to East Africa's 
export trade; the remaining eight crops contribute only 19.4 per 
cent to total exports, although products such as tea, meat and 
cashew nuts might become more important in the future. 
Another way of looking at agriculture's contribution to exports 
is to compare the total value of exports with East Africa's exports 
ill classes 0, 1, 2 and 4 of the Standard International Trade classifi-
cation. These are the classes under which trade in food, beverages 
and tobacco, inedible crude materials, except fuels, and animal 
and vegetable oils and fats are recorded. The relevant figures, are 
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giveii in Table II.6. As far as East Africa is concerned, they reveal 
that over the period 1954-64 the contribution of these four classes 
to total exports has at no time been less than 85 per cent: in fact 
in the earlier years their contribution was over 90 per cent, and 
has fluctuated between this figure and 85 per cent. Exports in classes 
1 and 4 are, however, insignificant compared to classes 0 and 2 
which include all food and "crude materials, inedible, except fuels". 
These last two are the ones which are dominant in this classification 
as they include all coffee, tea, cotton and sisal, the major exports 
from East Africa. 
Within East Africa dependence on the export of these commodities 
differs somewhat as between the three countries (Table II.5). 
Uganda happens to be the most dependent on the export of these 
products: during the Korean War boom their share in total exports 
rose to 93 per cent, and even in 1964 they contributed as much as 
85 per cent to the total value of her exports. For Uganda the only 
significant export not included in this list is copper alloys, which 
in 1964 fetched £6.2 million. 
Kenya is less dependent on the export of these commodities than 
Uganda. Her lesser dependence on the export of these commodities, 
is not particularly that she exports more non-agricultural com-
modities than Uganda: examination of Table II.6 will show that 
there is very little difference between the three countries with 
regard to the share in total exports of commodities in the S.I.T.C. 
groups 0, 1, 2 and 4. Such differences as do exist (Uganda being 
more dependent on the export of commodities in these classes, 
than Kenya or Tanzania) are not as big as those shown in Table II. 5; 
as a matter of fact Kenya's biggest non-agricultural export has 
usually been sodium carbonate (soda ash) whose value at less than 
£1.5 million has been a poor match for Uganda's copper alloys 
even before the more recent rise in copper exports. The real difference 
between Kenya and Uganda which accounts for Kenya's lower 
dependence on our twelve agricultural exports is that Kenya exports 
more of the other agricultural commodities which are not included 
in this group. Thus in 1961 her exports of butter were valued at 
about ££ million, and in addition she exported sizeable quantities 
of preserved fruits, vegetables, edible nuts and eggs. In this respect 
Kenya's exports are much more diversified than those of her neigh-
bours, and evidence will be offered below to show that even with 
regard to the twelve exports selected, hers is a less concentrated 
range of agricultural exports. 
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Tanganyika is the least dependent of the three countries on the 
export of commodities in the S.I.T.C. groups 0,1, 2 and 4, although 
by any standards her dependence is also high. The explanation is 
to be found in her substantial exports of minerals, dominated by 
diamonds, which have risen considerably in total value since 1949; 
these have risen from £1.6 million in 1949 to nearly £8 million in 1964. 
A more detailed examination of export figures in Table II.5 
reveals that the relative importance of the twelve commodities 
differs widely as between countries, and that individual countries 
share the same characteristics with many developing countries of 
depending on only a few commodities as a source of their foreign 
exchange earnings. Thus for Uganda coffee and cotton are the key 
exports, and on the average contributed 76.7 per cent to the value 
of total exports over this period. In fact in 1964 robusta coffee 
alone was responsible for nearly half (49.6 per cent) of the value 
of all domestic exports, and both arabica and robusta coffee brought 
in 54.9 per cent of the export proceeds earned. No single commodity 
dominates the exports of the other two countries to the same 
extent, but in Tanganyika sisal is extremely important (constituting 
29 per cent of total exports over this period), and arabica coffee 
has lately assumed a similar position in Kenya's exports (28.8 per 
cent). Taking the three most valuable export crops in each country, 
we have the following picture with regard to their contribution to 
total exports. 
Table II.I 
Contribution to total exports by crop 
Value as % of 
CROP 
Total Exports 
(1960-2 average) 
Kenya 
Arabica Coffee 
Tea 
Sisal 
28.8 
12.5 
12.1 
Total 53.4 
Uganda 
Robusta Coffee 
Cotton 
Arabica Coffee 
36.9 
33.7 
6.1 
Total 76.7 
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CROP 
Value as % of 
Total Exports 
(1960-2 average) 
Tanganyika 
Sisal 
Cotton 
Arabica Coffee 
29.0 
14.9 
12.3 
Total 56.2 
A further attempt has been made to portray the comparative 
degrees of diversification in East Africa by fitting a Lorenz curve 
to the data in Table II.5. The results are shown in chart II. 1. 
As would be expected, East Africa's agricultural exports are more 
highly diversified than those for individual countries. The major 
reason for this is simply that East Africa is a much wider region 
and so offers a more diversified range of ecological zones than 
any individual country. Next comes Kenya whose degree of diver-
sification is, however, not really far ahead of Tanganyika, whereas 
Uganda's agricultural exports are by far the least diversified.* 
For East Africa as a region 80 per cent of her export earnings 
derive from the export of these twelve major crops, and this percent-
age has not shown any tendency to fall since 1949. In 1949 these 
twelve exports constituted 82 per cent of the total value of exports; 
they reached a peak in 1951 during the Korean War boom for agricul-
tural products when their share in total exports rose to 87 per cent, 
and were around 80 per cent in 1962/3 (Table II.7). Of course the 
importance of individual items in this broad classification has 
altered: for instance Kenya has decreased her dependence on sisal, 
and has instead become more dependent on arabica coffee. However, 
the persistence of high dependence on these twelve commodities 
gives credence to the view that East Africa's dependence on agricul-
tural exports is bound to continue in the future for a considerable 
length of time. In fact suggestions have already been made that a 
vigorous policy of industrialisation is unlikely to alter substantially 
the composition of East Africa's exports, and that a better strategy 
for East Africa would be to base industrialisation policy on import 
* Since objectives of diversification usually run counter to those for short-
term profitability, it cannot be inferred from these observations that Uganda 
has been the loser for having had a less diversified combination of agricultural 
exports without further examination. 
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substitution. Dr. Brian Van Arkadie has this to say about the 
prospects for export promotion in relation to industrialisation in 
East Africa: "The export promotion possibilities set out above 
are at best marginal and at worst risky and problematical. It seems 
that the main export effort for the coming few years must take 
the form of increasing the quantity and widening the range of 
agricultural exports. Therefore the main conclusion of this paper 
is that for the coming decade import substitution is the preferable 
strategy for industrialisation, and that there will be only a small 
role for export promotion of manufactured products."2* 
Within East Africa the changes in the degree of dependence on 
these crops over time differs as between the three countries. Uganda, 
the most dependent of the three countries on the export of these 
products, gained most from the Korean War boom; their share 
in her total exports rose to 93 per cent, and even in 1964 they 
contributed as much as 85 per cent to the total value of her exports. 
For Uganda the only important export not included in this list 
is copper alloys which in 1964 were valued at £6.2 million, but 
their rapid rise in value over the last few years has not greatly 
affected the share of agricultural exports in total exports because 
these too have been rising. 
Although Kenya is slightly less dependent on these commodities 
than Uganda, her dependence on them has been rising since the 
early fifties rather than falling. In the early fifties the share of these 
exports in total exports was around 77 per cent but began to rise 
after 1954 to just over 80 per cent and ended this period at an 
average of 78 per cent. As will be shown in Chapter III this pheno-
menon is associated with the rapid increase in Kenya's export of 
arabica coffee; in 1949 the value of her coffee exports was a mere 
£ l i million, but had risen to £15 million by 1964, and had assumed 
first place as the most valuable export from Kenya in 1952. 
Tanganyika, the least dependent of the three on the export of 
these commodities, has been decreasing her dependence on these 
exports, though the decline is not dramatic. In the earlier years 
these commodities were contributing around 80 per cent to her 
exports, but since 1954 this percentage has been falling, and was 
72 in 1961; the rapid rise in sisal prices in 1963, however, again 
* Export prospects for manufactured products may not look as gloomy as this 
on another set of assumptions: namely if there is greater co-operation between 
the developing countries themselves, especially those of tropical Africa and the 
Indian Ocean region. This possibility is discussed in.3 
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jerked it up to 76. Reference has already been made to the impor-
tance of mineral exports to Tanganyika. In effect a fall in the con-
tribution of agricultural exports to her exports should be interpreted 
as indicating a faster increase in the value of non-agricultural 
exports rather than that her agricultural exports had been stagnating: 
as will be shown in Chapter III the total value of her exports has 
been rising faster than that for Uganda. 
2 Agricultural exports as a source of capital 
The contribution of agricultural exports to capital formation is 
two-fold. The most direct contribution is when funds used to 
finance capital projects are obtained, in one form or another, from 
agricultural exports proceeds. This is the subject of the present 
section. The second way in which agricultural exports contribute 
to capital formation is indirect: because of their effect on the level 
of effective demand, agricultural exports affect (he level of capital 
formation in East Africa. This aspect will be discussed in the next 
section. 
Capital formation is undertaken either by the public sector or by 
private entrepreneurs. The extent of the contribution of agricultural 
exports to both forms of capital formation is very difficult to quantify 
in East Africa except in the case of Uganda with respect to the 
public sector. In Uganda the main forms of diverting earnings from 
agricultural exports to finance public development projects has 
been effected through the operation of marketing board surpluses 
and export taxes. 
Tab le 11.2 
SOURCES O F DEVELOPMENT F U N D S IN U G A N D A 1945-60 (£'000) 
Reserve The 4 African Capital Local 
Fund 1948 Dev. Dev. Inv. 
for Funds Fund Fund Fund Total 
From To P.W.D. 
Wartime Accumulation 703 — — — — 703 
Cotton P. A.F. 
(a) grants . . . . — 6,000 18,200 — — 24,200 
(b) loans . . . . — — — 5,000 — 5,000 
Coffee P.A.F. 
General . . . . — 625 — — — 625 
Revenue Balance — — — 178 7,899 8,077 
TOTAL . . . . 703 6,625 18,200 5,178 7,899 38,580 
Source: D,A. Lury: "Cotton and Coffee Growers and Government Develop-
ment Finance in Uganda 1945-60", East African Economic Review, 
Vol. 10, No. 1, June 1963, p. 51. 
The importance of agricultural exports in East Africa 11 
In Table II.2 showing sources of development funds for 
the period 1945-60, it will be found that Price Assistance Funds have 
contributed more than three-quarters of development expenditure. 
Most of this money has come from the Cotton Price Assistance 
Fund in the form of grants and has largely been used for the ex-
pansion of education, and to a lesser extent, health facilities. In 
the late fifties £5 million was also made available in the form of 
a loan for the construction of roads and buildings from the same 
fund. 
Further, another £19,3 million was earmarked for development 
projects from export taxes on cotton and coffee over this period: 
cotton export tax provided £12.3 million while that on coffee 
yielded £7.0 million, These monies were paid into a capital develop-
ment fund as a result of a decision in 1954/5 that any excess revenue 
over £4 million from export taxes should be paid into that fund. 
This means that £4 million was made available for development 
purposes as a result of transferring money from the Price Assistance 
Funds and taxing cotton and coffee exports.* 
It should be added that this was not the only way cotton and 
coffee exports contributed to government spending in Uganda. 
Over this period, the revenue collected from cotton exports to 
finance recurrent government expenditure amounted to £31.2 
million (representing 23.1 per cent of payments to growers), and 
the yield from coffee export tax for the same purpose was of the 
order of £17.7 million (or 18.3 per cent of payments to growers).** 
Since the distinction between development and recurrent expendi-
ture is hard to draw, it is apparent that most of this revenue must 
have had a developmental effect on the Uganda economy; after 
all, development expenditure was undertaken on the understanding 
that the future recurrent expenditure would have to be borne by 
the recurrent budget. The contribution of export taxes to total 
revenue can be seen from Table II. 8B, This table shows that between 
1949 and 1958 export taxes were the most important source of 
government revenue in Uganda, and that from 1950 to 1952 they 
formed more than half the total tax revenue. 
* For a critical appraisal of this policy see David Walker and Cyril Ehrlich, 
"Stabilisation and Development Policy in Uganda. An Appraisal", 
Kyklos 12 (1959), pp.341-53; Reproduced in Philip W. Bell and Katharine 
H. Bell (Eds.), African Economic Problems, Vol. IV, Oxford University Press, 
Nairobi, 1965. 
** The source for these figures is the same as that for the table above. 
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It is not possible to find a direct link between agricultural export 
proceeds and the level of public investment in the other two countries. 
In financing their development projects Kenya and Tanganyika 
have depended more on foreign sources of funds than Uganda as 
the table below will show. Whether or not it was a good policy in 
the long run for the Uganda Government to tap these export 
proceeds the way they did, the fact remains that Uganda attained 
her independence with a much lower public debt and larger external 
assets than her East African neighbours, and this can be attributed 
to the contribution which agricultural exports have made to public 
investment in this country. 
Table 11.3 
SOURCES OF F INANCE FOR DEVELOPMENT PLANS (In £'000) 
Local 
Total C. D. & IV. Loan Resources 
Kenya 42,450 3,500 23,450 15,500 
Tanganyika 24,450 5,349 10,000 9,101 
Uganda 28,500 2,500 2,000 24,000 
Source: The Colonial Territories 1953-4, (H.M.S.O. Cmd. 9619) 1954, Appendix 
III and cited in the East Africa Royal Commission Report, (H.M.S.O. 
Cmd. 9475) 1955, p. 95. 
see page 21. 
In the private sector agricultural exports can contribute to 
capital formation if the recipients of these incomes decide not to 
use them for current consumption, but they either plough them 
back into their own business, use them in some other business 
venture, or lend them to some other set of entrepreneurs who 
would invest them. In Kenya and Tanganyika where large estates 
operate it would be possible to find out how much of their current 
income they plough back into their farming business and how much 
they decide to invest in other ventures. For instance C. W. Guille-
baud has produced figures relating to the sisal industry of Tanga-
nyika and found that a sample of ten sisal companies had invested 
27 per cent of their profits in their estates between 1951 and 1956. 
In absolute terms, this was the equivalent of £ 2 | million for the 
entire period, and was made possible because of the high prices of 
sisal in the early 50's.'1 Similarly in Kenya, and in other plantation 
industries in Tanganyika, expansion of existing estates and the 
construction of processing capacity have been financed out of 
current earnings in periods of rising prices for agricultural exports, 
except that in Kenya political events of the last few years have 
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adversely affected the willingness of the European community to 
invest in the improvement and expansion of their farms. 
In Uganda by far the largest proportion of agricultural exports 
is produced by peasant farmers about whose economic transactions 
we as yet know very little. The fact that coffee acreages have expand-
ed so fast over the last few years must be evidence of considerable 
investment by the peasant farmer in his farms, but there are no 
reliable estimates of the size of this hi vestment; and the existing 
series of crop acreage statistics are mere estimates which are subject 
to a large margin of error. On the other hand the presumption 
that the peasant must have millions of pounds under his mattress 
which he could invest has persisted for some time and financial 
institutions have at various times sought to channel these "missing 
millions" into investment elsewhere without very much success. 
These were funds which peasant farmers are supposed to have 
received during boom periods but apparently have neither invested 
nor spent on consumption. However, the currency statistics do 
not support this thesis. The ratio of currency in circulation to money 
income is not higher than in similar economies. 
3 Agricultural e x p o r t s as a m a r k e t for non-agricul ture 
One of the major obstacles to promoting industries in developing 
countries has been the size of their own home markets. The smallness 
of their home markets has dictated the setting up of plants with 
small capacity with the result that economies of scale are lost and 
this, added to the other difficulties, greatly reduces the scope for 
a rapid rate of industrialisation in these countries. The .smallness 
of the home market is itself a symptom of the low levels of income, 
and anything that could be done to raise these incomes would be 
a very significant stimulant to the pace of industrialisation in 
East Africa. Because they constitute such a high proportion of 
gross domestic product agricultural exports generate the major 
part of domestic monetary demand and their expansion can, more 
than anything else, contribute to the achievement of this aim. 
The high propensity to consume among the African population 
in East Africa, while it may be a barrier to financing investment 
from personal savings, acts as a big inducement to business firms 
to put their money into consumption goods industries when incomes 
are rising. 
Table II.9 sets out the relationship between agricultural exports 
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Table 11.4 
EAST AFRICA 
AGRICULTURAL EXPORTS 1Y COMMODITY 1960-62 
Commodity 
Cotton 
Sisal Fibre, Flume and Tow 
Arabica Coffee 
Robusta Coffee 
Tea 
Meat and Meat Preparations 
Hides and Skins 
Pyrethrum (flowers and extract) 
Cashew Nuts 
Groundnuts 
Wattle Bark and Extract 
Maize Unmilled 
Total 
Average 
Value 
1960-62 
£'000 
21,609 
19,472 
19,167 
15,080 
7,542 
4,419 
4,309 
3,173 
2,335 
1,129 
1,103 
698 
As % Tolal 
Domestic 
Export 
17.0 
15.3 
15.1 
11.9 
5.9 
3.5 
3.4 
2.5 
1.8 
0.9 
0.9 
0.5 
59.3% 
100,036 78.7% 
Source: Annual Trade Reports. 
Note: Domestic exports exclude interterritorial exports within East Africa 
as well as re-exports. 
Table 11.5 
C O M M O D I T Y E X P O R T S W I T H I N I N D I V I D U A L 
C O U N T R I E S 1960-62 
Average Value 1960-62 
Commodity 
KENYA 
As% of 
Total 
£'000 Exports 
UGANDA 
As% of 
Total 
£'000 Exports 
TANGANYIKA 
As%of 
Total 
£'000 Exports 
Cotton 635 1.8 13,302 33.7 7,671 14.9 
Sisal 4,360 12.1 44 0.1 15,068 29.0 
Arabica Coffee . . 10,416 28.8 2,399 6.1 6,352 12.3 
Robusta Coffee — — 14,564 36.9 516 1.0 
Tea 4,535 12.5 1,641 4 .2 1,363 2.6 
Meat and Meat 
Preparations .. 2,295 6.4 5 lieg. 2,118 4.1 
Hides and Skins .. 1,568 4.3 1,046 2.6 1,695 3.3 
Pyrethrum 3,088 8.5 .— — 85 0 .2 
Cashew Nuts 247 0.7 — — 2,089 4 .0 
Groundnuts 91 0.3 479 1.2 560 1.1 
Wattle Bark Extract 740 2 .0 .— — 363 0.7 
Maize Unmilled 398 1.1 31 0.1 269 0.5 
Total: . . 28,373 78.5 33,511 84.9 38,149 74.0 
Source: Annual Trade Reports. 
Table 11.6 
EAST AFRICA: DOMESTIC EXPORTS IN S.l.T.C. 0, 1, 2, 4*, 1954-64 
Year 
1954 
1955 
1956 
1957 
1958 
1959 
1960 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
£ '000 
KENYA 
of 
otal 
Exports 
T  
16,895 
21,529 
25,312 
22,426 
25,950 
29,085 
31,159 
30,455 
33,443 
39,147 
40,041 
83.4 
83.9 
87.3 
85.1 
88.6 
87.3 
88.5 
86.2 
88.2 
89.3 
85.0 
UGANDA 
% of 
Total 
£'000 Exports 
40,422 
41,813 
40,336 
44,071 
43,164 
39,216 
37,871 
36.132 
33;910 
47,757 
58,061 
99.6 
99.8 
99.8 
96.1 
95.1 
93.2 
91.1 
92.2 
90.1 
92.8 
90.1 
TANGANYIKA 
£'000 Exports 
31,931 
31,811 
40,992 
35.237 
36,266 
39,056 
48,242 
40,664 
43,612 
56,553 
61,195 
88.1 
87.9 
91.5 
89.6 
87.0 
86.2 
87.9 
83.6 
85.1 
89.0 
87.3 
EAST AFRICA 
%of 
Total 
£'000 Exports 
89,248 
95,153 
106,640 
101,734 
105,380 
107,357 
117,272 
107,251 
110,965 
143,457 
159,297 
91.9 
91.7 
93.4 
91.1 
90.5 
89.0 
89.1 
87.1 
87.5 
90.3 
87.7 
"For definition see page 6. 
Table M.7 
EAST AFRICA: TOTAL A N D AGRICULTURAL EXPORTS 1945-1966 
KENYA UGANDA TANGANYIKA EAST AFRICA 
(1) (2) (2) as (1) (2) (2) as 
%of 
(1) (2) (2) as (D* (2)* (2) as 
Year Total Agric: %of %of % of 
Exports Exports (1) (1) (1) (I) 
£m £m £m £m £m £m £m £m 
82 1949 11.0 8.3 76 23.4 20.9 89 19.2 15.6 81 53.6 44.2 
1950 17.2 13.3 78 28.7 25.8 90 23.8 18.6 78 69.6 57.7 83 
1951 24.1 18.2 76 47.2 43.7 93 39.3 33.9 86 110.6 95.9 87 
1952 25.8 20.0 78 47.2 43.2 92 47.0 35.6 76 120.0 98.9 82 
1953 19.5 14.9 76 33.4 29.4 88 34.5 27.0 78 87.4 71.3 81 
1954 20.3 15.6 77 40.6 36.6 90 36.3 27.9 77 97.1 80.2 83 
1955 25.7 21.3 83 41.9 38.7 92 36.2 26.8 74 103.8 86.8 84 
1956 29.0 23.8 82 40.4 37.0 92 44.8 33.7 75 114.2 94.5 83 ' 
1957 . 26.4 21.4 81 45.9 41.1 90 39.3 28.2 72 111.6 90.8 81 
1958 29.3 23.6 81 45.4 40.8 90 41.7 29.7 71 116.4 94.1 81 
1959 33.3 26.6 80 42.1 36.3 86 45.3 32.1 71 120.7 95.1 79 
1960 35.2 28.3 80 41.6 35.1 84 54.9 40.4 74 131.6 103.8 79 
1961 35.3 27.7 78 39.2 33.5 85 48.7 34.8 72 123.2 96.0 78 
1962 37.9 29.9 79 37.6 32.0 85 51.2 37.9 74 126.8 99.8 79 
1963 43.8 34.2 78 51.5 44.8 87 63.6 48.6 76 158.9 127.6 80 
1964 47.7 35.5 75 64.4 54.9 85 70.1 53.9 77 181.7 144.3 79-
1965 47.2 32.6 69 62.7 51.1 81 62.8 46.5 74 172.7 129.9 75 
1966 58.1 42.1 72 65.9 55.8 84 79.1 59.2 75 203.1 157.1 78 
* Figures may not add up due to rounding. 
Source: Annual Trade Reports of Kenya. Uganda and Tanganyika. 
T a b l e 11.8a 
G R O W T H O F C E N T R A L G O V E R N M E N T T A X R E V E N U E IN U G A N D A 1948-53 
£'000 
1948 1949 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 
Income Tax 400 602 66! 639 1.169 1.785 2.189 2,756 3.160 3,078 3,231 3,533 3.542 3.567 3,670 3,805 
Estate Tax 20 12 36 9 3S 7 27 40 37 43 71 55 41 29 29 38 
Poll, Education Tax Etc. 721 513 537 571 605 629 863 528 553 599 628 619 606 570 343 376 
Total Direct Tax 1.141 1,127 1,234 1.219 1,812 2.421 3,079 3,324 3,750 3,720 3,930 4,207 4,189 4,166 4,042 3,919 
Expor t Taxes 1,449 2,968 4,167 8,106 8,269 4,045 6,626 5,808 6,166 6.256 5.662 4.985 3,302 2,175 2,543 5,837 
(Coffee Export Tax) 339 295 1,158 2.107 1.776 1,405 2,632 2,576 3,567 3,073 3.283 2,465 1,074 472 1,070 3,870 
(Cotton Export Tax) 1,106 2.668 2,977 5,907 6.442 2,601 3,936 3,144 3,574 3,193 2,399 2,477 2,177 1,649 1,430 1.930 
Impor t Duties 1.565 1,761 2,080 2,888 2.995 3,308 3,776 4,260 4,222 4,128 4,643 5,340 5,914 6,307 7,706 9.019 
Excise Taxes 489 663 635 973 923 997 1,426 1,629 2,055 2,525 2,473 2.285 2,423 2,675 2,959 3,442 
Licences Etc. 180 199 228 239 261 336 419 416 418 480 613 709 647 654 897 947 
Total Indirect Taxes 3,685 5,591 7,110 12,206 12.448 8,686 12,747 12,113 12,861 13,387 13,391 13,319 12.286 11,811 14,105 19,245 
Total Tax Revenue 4,824 6.718 8.344 13,425 14.260 11,107 15,326 15.437 16,611 17.107 17,321 17,526 16,475 15,977 18,147 26.164 
Source: Tables II. 5A and II.5B are taken f r o m : Dha ram P. Ghai. Taxation for Development, ( East Afr ican Publishing House, 1966). pp. 24-25. 
Tab i e 11.8b 
P E R C E N T A G E S O F V A R I O U S T A X E S IN T O T A L T A X R E V E N U E : U G A N D A , 1948-63 
Item 1948 1949 1950 1951 1952 1 953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 
Income Tax 8 3 9 . 0 7 . 9 4 . 8 8 . 2 16.1 14.3 17 8 19.0 18.0 18.7 20 .2 21 .5 T-> 3 20 .2 16 4 
Estate Duty 0 4 0 . 2 0 . 5 0 .07 0 . 3 0 .06 0 . 2 0 3 0 . 2 0 . 2 0 . 4 0 . 3 0 . 2 ~d'.2 0 . 2 0 1 
Poll, Education Tax Etc. 14 9 7 . 6 6 .4 4 . 2 4 . 2 5 .7 5 . 6 3 4 3 . 3 3 . 5 3 . 6 3 .5 3 . 7 3 . 6 1 .9 0 3 
Total Direct Tax 23 6 16.8 14.8 9 .07 12.7 21.86 20.1 21 22 .5 2 1 . 7 2 2 . 7 24 .0 25 .4 26.1 2 2 . 3 16 9 
Export Taxes 30 0 44 .2 50 .0 60.4 58.0 36.4 43 .2 37 6 37.1 36 .6 32.7 28 .4 20 .0 13.6 14.0 25 ? 
(Coffee Export Tax) 7 0 4 . 4 13.9 15.7 12.5 12.6 17.2 16 7 15.5 18.0 19.0 14.1 6 .5 3 .0 5 . 9 16 7 
{Cotton Export Tax) 
import Duties 
Excise Taxes 
22 9 39.7 35.7 44 .0 45 .2 23 .4 25.7 20 4 21.5 18.6 13.9 14.1 13.2 10.3 7 . 9 S 3 
32 5 26 .2 24.9 21 .5 21 .0 29 .8 24 .6 27 6 25 .4 24 .1 26 .8 30 .5 35.9 39 .5 42 .5 38 9 
10 2 9 . 9 7 . 6 7 . 3 6 .5 9 . 0 9 . 3 10 6 12.4 14.7 14.3 13.0 14.7 16.7 16.3 14 9 
Licences Etc. 3 7 3 .0 2 . 7 1.8 1 .8 3 .0 2 . 7 9 7 2 . 5 2 . 8 3 . 5 4 . 1 3 . 9 4 . 1 4 . 9 4 1 
Total Indirect Tax 76 4 83.3 85.2 90.95 87.3 78.2 79.8 78 5 77.4 78 .2 77 .3 76 .0 74 .5 73.9 77.7 83' 1 
Table 11.9 
A G R I C U L T U R A L E X P O R T S * A S A P E R C E N T A G E O F M O N E T A R Y G R O S S D O M E S T I C P R O D U C T 
Year 
K E N Y A 
( i ) (•?) 
Monetary Agricul-
G.D.P. at tural 
Factor Exports 
Cost 
£m £m 
(2) as 
, of (I) 
1954 
1955 
1956 
1957 
1958 
1959 
1960 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
112 
134 
145 
154 
155 
161 
175 
176 
180 
192 
212 
15 
21 
23 
21 
23 
26 
28 
27 
29 
34 
35 
13 
15 
16 
13 
15 
16 
16 
15 
16 
17 
16 
(D 
£m 
93 
102 
103 
109 
106 
108 
110 
111 
107 
128 
140 
U G A N D A 
(2) 
£m 
(2) as 
% of(l) 
36 
38 
37 
41 
40 
36 
35 
33 
32 
44 
54 
39 
37 
35 
37 
38 
33 
31 
30 
29 
34 
39 
TANGANYIKA** 
U) 
£m 
79 
81 
89 
92 
97 
106 
114 
115 
(2) 
£m 
21.9 
26.8 
33.7 
28.2 
29.7 
32.1 
40.4 
34.8 
(2) as 
% °f W 
35 
32 
37 
30 
30 
30 
35 
30.2 
Source: Statistical Abstracts, various years. 
* Agricultural Exports as defined in the notes to Table II.4. 
. . A f t e r 1961 a different compilation of G.D.P. figures was introduced in Tanganyika which makes figures for 1962 
onwards difficult to compare with those of earlier years. 
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and monetary gross domestic product. From this table it can be 
seen that Uganda and Tanganyika depend to a much greater 
extent than Kenya on these twelve commodities as a source of 
income. Uganda and Tanganyika derive nearly one-third of their 
monetary income from the proceeds of these commodities, and 
therefore for them the buoyance (or lack of it) of their economies 
is largely dependent on whether the total value of these commodities 
is rising or stagnating. It is the recognition of this relationship 
between industrialisation and agriculture that has made economists 
recommend schemes for rapid improvement in agricultural pro-
duction as an aid to industrialisation: a stagnant level of agricultural 
exports means stagnation of the whole economy at the present 
level of development, and this applies equally to the industrial 
sector in so far as this is based on the home market. This fact is 
very well recognised, for instance, in the Kenya Development 
Plan, 1964-70, when it. is stated that "this dependence on agriculture 
will not be significantly reduced by 1970 and hence rapid economic 
growth over the next six years can only be achieved if the agricultural 
sector expands at a healthy rate. It follows that agricultural develop-
ment and supporting infra-structure investment must be accorded 
the highest priority in the allocation of resources during the plan ning 
period" (page 45 of the Plan).5 
In a similar manner the Uganda Second Five-year Plan stresses 
agricultural production as the spearhead for development of the 
economy. The following quotation appears at the beginning of 
Chapter Four of the Plan: "For the next generation and longer, 
even with the maximum diversification of the economy, agriculture 
will remain the most important source of domestic income, foreign 
exchange and employment"/' 
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PAST TRENDS IN AGRICULTURAL EXPORTS: 1949/50 
TO 1962/3 
There are two main reasons for undertaking a study of the 
behaviour of agricultural exports over a long period. The first is 
that purely random factors affecting the value of agricultural 
exports are eliminated, while at the same time their disturbing 
influences along the trend can be isolated. It is obvious that the 
period for which observations are made must be long enough 
to enable us to separate trend factors from purely random and 
seasonal ones; on the other hand the period should not be so 
long that it includes periods which bear little relation to each 
other. As far as the agricultural exports of East Africa are concerned 
the period after the Second World War forms a distinct phase in 
the history of their development, different from that before the 
war, although there are some similarities. 
In 1949 events in East Africa had come back to fairly "normal" 
conditions compared to those obtaining during the war. But the 
attitude and approach to the development of East Africa took a 
different turn after the war. The war had accelerated changes in 
the attitudes of colonial powers and in the case of Britain this change 
was symbolised in the setting up of the Colonial Development 
Corporation and more financial allocations being made to schemes 
under the Colonial Development and Welfare Acts.* The Colonial 
Administration also felt more obligations to draw up development 
plans for the possessions. Even if these plans were far from the 
comprehensive planning we know today they were a practical 
demonstration of a different approach, and provided the framework 
for a considerable volume of investment in infra-structure made 
* The Colonial Development and Welfare Acts were actually passed in 
1940 and 1945, and the underlying idea behind them can be traced to the Colonial 
Development Act of 1929. See E.A. Brett, "The Politics of British Aid Giving: 
The Background to the Colonial Development and Welfare Acts of 1940 and 
1945" in Problems of Foreign Aid (Oxford University Press for the Institute 
of Public Administration, London and Nairobi, 1963). 
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possible by the very high prices for agricultural exports in the early 
'fifties. 
Durmg this period the money economy spread rapidly through-
out East Africa and, in Tanzania and Uganda especially, millions 
of peasant farmers who had previously been farming for subsistence 
were brought into touch with world markets through the production 
for sale of these few agricultural exports. In Kenya the benefits 
were largely confined to the expatriate population, but taking 
East Africa as a whole these exports have increasingly been produced 
by Africans. 
The achievement of political independence by all three countries, 
a process completed in 1963 with Kenya's attainment of independ-
ence, has once again changed the context of economic activity and 
even increased the pressure for rapid development. 
A second reason for taking a long look at our historical past 
is that we can thereby get some inkling of what we can possibly 
achieve in the future over a similar span of years. In East Africa 
the need to move towards comprehensive planning has not only 
led to the drawing up of five-year development plans but has also 
implied the setting of fairly long-term targets covering more than 
fifteen years. For instance Uganda intends to double per capita 
income in the money sector within the next fifteen years, while 
Tanganyika plans on more than doubling her per capita income 
between 1964 and 1980, and raising average life expectation at 
birth from 35-40 years to 50. If expected changes in key parameters 
are given, such as the propensity to save, the capital-output ratio 
etc. a study of historical trends will give us a method of testing the 
feasibility of attaining new plan targets. In fact since planning is 
a two-way traffic, realistic targets can only be set in the light of 
what has been happening in the economy. For example, the fact 
that Kenya and Tanganyika have been increasing the quantity 
of their agricultural exports at an average rate of about 7 per cent 
per annum must be taken into account in setting targets for the 
agricultural export sector; and because of the interdependence of 
the export sector and other sectors of the economy and the pre-
dominance of agriculture, this rate of increase will influence the 
rate of growth of income that can be expected in the future. 
This period is also interesting to study because of the movement 
of agricultural prices which have obtained. Starting with fairly 
low prices in 1949, there was a period of extremely high prices 
following the outbreak of the Korean War. Thus 1951 and 1952 
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were years of very high prices for agricultural products and these 
boom conditions hovered on until 1958, although there was some 
marked decline after 1953 especially for Tanganyika whose sisal 
prices were falling fast (see Chart III. 7). After 1958 price declines 
became more pronounced, and with minor fluctuations reached 
a low level in 1963. In that year there was a welcome recovery 
mainly attributable to favourable prices for coffee and sisal. Indica-
tions at the moment are that this recovery was at best temporary 
and connected with the successful conclusion of the International 
Coffee Agreement. This agreement was concluded in 1962 between 
producing and consuming countries, and aims at preventing coffee 
prices from falling below their 1962 level by regulating export 
quotas to traditional markets. Already in the past prices have, at 
various times, fallen below SO.38 per pound which is the floor 
price set by the International Coffee Council, and quotas have been 
cut not only by the Council but by the Inter-Africa Coffee Organis-
ation in a bid to arrest further declines in prices.* 
Such fluctuations in prices first of all affect the value of a country's 
exports depending on their composition. Secondly, there will be 
an attempt to alter the composition of exports by concentrating 
production on those crops whose prices are rising and away from 
those with falling prices if it is believed that these changes are likely 
to persist for some time into the future. The nature and extent of 
this price effect depends on many factors; alternatives must exist 
and be known to exist, there must be willingness and. ability to 
adjust, and the period of gestation of both possible export crops 
and existing ones has to be taken into account, Developing countries 
are known to be slow to respond to new circumstances, especially 
because production is for the most part undertaken by millions 
of scattered and illiterate farmers to whom economic information 
often seeps very slowly. The important point to make, however, 
is that whatever the reasons for failing to adjust to new circum-
stances, it is the ability to adjust quickly and effectively to new 
situations that will determine the extent to which the terms of trade 
move against a country. 
* In 1966 the International Coffee Council executive announced an 
overall cut of 4 i per cent in export quotas to traditional markets. In addition 
to this cut the Inter-Africa Coffee Organisation also announced a cut of 4J per 
cent in the quotas of its member countries, This is enough evidence of the serious-
ness with which coffee producing countries look at the future of coffee prices. 
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Computation of indices 
The basic indices used to measure quantity changes in this 
study are Laspeyre's quantity indices with the 1960-62 period as 
the base. This means that the various commodities are combined 
with weights corresponding to their relative prices in 1960-62. 
This is the weighting system which seems most relevant for calcula-
ting the past rate of growth of the quantity of all agricultural exports, 
as a guide to projecting their future rate of growth, since recent 
prices almost surely give a better indication of future prices than 
do prices a decade ago. Moreover, for interpreting past growth, 
recent prices provide a weighting system which reflects the relative 
values of the various commodities as they have in fact worked out 
after past price fluctuations.* The basic indices used to measure 
price changes are the implicit indices obtained by dividing the value 
of agricultural exports at current prices by their value at 1960-62 
prices. Thus the implicit price indices are in effect Paasche indices 
with given-year quantity weights. 
Two variant forms of quantity indices are also calculated to 
indicate the effect of alternative formulae. The 1963 variants are 
simply Laspeyre's indices in which 1963 sisal prices have been used 
for Tanganyika and Kenya, and 1963 robusta coffee prices for 
Uganda, in lieu of 1960-62 prices. The linked variants are the 
result of linking a series of one-year Laspeyre's indices, in each of 
which the previous year's prices are used as weights. The linked 
variants thus differ much more fundamentally from the basic 
Laspeyre's indices. They describe the past, not in terms of how 
prices have worked out and how they may be assumed for the 
future, but in terms of the fluctuating prices in the successive years 
of the past period. 
One notable feature of this period with respect to agricultural 
exports has been the diversity in trends of prices and volume of 
exports. This is brought out more clearly in Charts I I I . l , III.2, 
III.3, and III.4. It is clear from these charts that while the volume 
of agricultural exports has been rising fast for all countries during 
this period, prices have fluctuated a great deal. In 1962/3 Kenya 
* From these standpoints indices with recent price weights seem to be more 
meaningful than the official export and import indices, with 1954=100, The 
official indices are Fisher indices, which in effect use price weights combining 
1954 prices and current prices in each year. 
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and Tanganyika were exporting more than twice the volume of 
their 1949/50 agricultural exports, and Uganda had also nearly 
doubled her volume which was a notable achievement. Prices, 
however, had shown differing trends: in 1962/3 the price index 
for Uganda's agricultural exports was 3 per cent below its 1949/50 
level, that for Kenya was 25 per cent higher, while that for Tanga-
nyika was at the same level as in 1949/50. Thus looking at East 
Africa's agricultural exports over a long period it is apparent that 
increases in value of exports have taken place mainly because of 
increases in volume of exports, prices having played only a small 
part in the case of Kenya and having been adverse for Uganda. 
From this observation nothing definite can be concluded about 
the future but it would be wise to plan as if export earnings can 
only be expected when the volume of exports rises, the projection 
of price trends being unreliable in the long run even when a trend 
can be detected. Moreover, it is the quantity of agricultural exports 
which is within the ability of these countries to plan: they can do 
very little, if anything, about the prices they receive for their major 
exports. ( 
Major trends in quantity of exports 
The changes which have taken place in the quantity of agricul-
tural exports since 1949/50 are shown in Tables 111.2, III.3 and 
III.4. In each case the last column of the table shows percentage 
changes in total exports, agricultural exports, quantity of agricul-
tural exports and price indices between 1949/50 and 1962/3. From 
these calculations it is clear that Tanganyika has had the highest 
rate of growth of agricultural exports between the two periods. 
She increased the volume of her agricultural exports by 152 per cent 
against Kenya's 132 per cent and Uganda's 68 per cent. In some 
important senses percentage changes calculated for just two dates 
can give a misleading picture of real achievements; for one thing 
the magnitude of the percentage change may depend on the two 
dates selected, and in any case Uganda had achieved a high level 
of agricultural exports by 1949/50 especially if compared to Kenya, 
In order to meet some of these objections it was decided to fit 
regression lines to the simple Laspeyre's indices presented in Table 
III. 1, in order to work out the rates of growth of volume of agricul-
tural exports for each country. It was found from these calculations 
that Kenya has had an annual rate of growth of quantity of agricul-
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tural exports of 7.2 per cent, Tanganyika 6.9 per cent and Uganda 
4.2 per cent. 
Further evidence to prove that Uganda's volume of agricultural 
exports has lagged behind that of her neighbours will be offered 
below by using different indices. At this stage we should note that 
though her own achievement is high, taken by itself, Uganda has 
not been as successful as her neighbours in increasing the quantity 
of her agricultural exports. This failure has been reflected also in 
the growth of her gross domestic product: between 1958 and 1962 
there was virtually no change in her domestic product, and in fact 
there was stagnation in the economy until the recovery of 1963. 
On the other hand her neighbours, who had succeeded in increasing 
the volume of agricultural exports, were experiencing some growth, 
however modest, in their economies. Professor Clark has calculated 
that between 1954 and 1958 the respective rates of growth of 
monetary gross domestic product at current prices for Kenya, 
Uganda and Tanganyika were as follows: 8.4 per cent per annum, 
3.4 per cent and 5.5 per cent. For the succeeding period 1958 to 
1962 the rates of growth of monetary G.D.P. at current prices were 
again Kenya 3.9 per cent, Uganda 0.4 per cent and Tanganyika 
5.9 per cent.1 It would be idle to argue that these observations are 
unconnected; the position of agricultural exports in these economies 
is such that stagnation in their growth has serious repercussions 
throughout the whole economy. 
Two other indices have been calculated to measure quantity 
changes over this long period. These are set out in Tables III.5, 
III.6 and III.7 where for each country three different kinds of 
quantity indices are compared. Those in Column (1) in each case 
are simple Laspeyre's quantity indices taken from Table III.l . 
In the second column quantity indices adjusted for sisal prices in 
Kenya and Tanganyika and coffee prices in the case of Uganda 
are shown. The last column shows the linked indices. 
The adjusted Laspeyre's indices still show that Tanganyika 
had the highest volume increase of agricultural exports, while 
Uganda had the lowest increase. What they do, however, is to narrow 
the differences between countries. Thus Uganda's volume increase 
rises to 79 per cent compared to 68 per cent obtained by using the 
unadjusted indices, while Tanganyika's quantity increase falls 
from 152 per cent to 134 per cent. Kenya's quantity increase also 
falls from 132 per cent to 123 per cent. This could be because the 
adjustment affects Uganda less in the earlier period (1949/50) 
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when robusta coffee was not the leading export and comprised 
only 14 per cent of total exports, whereas by 1960-62 its share had 
risen to 37 per cent. On the other hand, for Tanganyika and Kenya 
the crops for which price adjustments have been made lost a certain 
degree of importance in total exports, especially in Kenya where 
sisal was no longer the leading export crop as it had been in 1949/50. 
In this case applying 1963 prices, which were substantially higher 
than 1960-62 average prices, would not very much affect the value 
of Uganda's total agricultural exports in the earlier years, whereas 
it would make a marked difference to the total value of agricultural 
exports of the other two countries in the same period. Towards 
the end of the period this same operation would then affect Uganda's 
exports significantly because robusta coffee had become the leading 
export crop from Uganda, but would not affect very much the 
value of the exports of the other two countries. This would mean 
a higher percentage increase in quantity for Uganda and a lower 
increase for Kenya and Tanganyika. 
The linked quantity indices, however, reverse the performance 
of Kenya and Tanganyika with Uganda still in third place. They 
show that Tanganyika's increase of volume of agricultural exports 
was 118 per cent (as compared to 152 per cent obtained by using 
simple Laspeyre's indices) and that of Kenya is then 167 per cent. 
The reversal in performance between Kenya and Tanganyika is 
a little surprising, but one thing at least is clear. This is that all 
three methods of measurement show that the volume of Uganda's 
agricultural exports has been rising more slowly than that of her 
East African neighbours. 
Commodi ty t rends in the th ree countries 
Having looked at quantity changes in aggregative terms, it is 
intended in this section to look at the commodity composition of 
East Africa's agricultural exports at the beginning and end of the 
period; in particular we are interested in finding out which com-
modities were responsible for the trends we have observed above. 
By just looking at the percentage increase between the years 1949/50 
and 1962/63 we, of course, run the danger of attributing undue 
importance to commodities which were insignificant in 1949/50 
but had somehow shown some increase by 1962/63. Thus in the 
case of Tanganyika it would be wrong to infer from the high per-
centage increases of her groundnuts exports of 1767 per cent (Table 
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III. 10) between these two dates that groundnuts made a greater 
contribution to the increase of the overall volume of agricultural 
exports than sisal, which increased by a mere 74 per cent. If, however, 
at the end of the period the commodity had also increased its relative 
importance in the total value of agricultural exports, then this 
would merit its being counted among the commodities which 
made a great contribution to the increase in the overall quantity.* 
This is in. fact true of Tanganyika's cashew nuts and meat, and 
more significantly still with Kenya's coffee. We must, therefore, 
be able to distinguish between increases in quantity which were 
important enough to influence the overall quantity index and those 
which, despite their high value numerically, could not have affected 
the overall index by very much. 
Bearing this in mind, there is no doubt that in the case of Tanga-
nyika sisal, arabica coffee and cotton made a very significant con-
tribution to the increase of total volume of exports, and that the 
contribution of groundnuts, robusta coffee and hides and skins 
was, in this respect, insignificant (Table III. 10). The quantity of 
cotton exported rose by 344 per cent and that of sisal by 74 per cent 
between 1949/50 and 1962/63. Since these were already leading 
exports in 1949 this increase in quantity was all the more significant 
in influencing the overall quantity index. Arabica coffee has also 
increased very fast in quantity, having registered an increase of 
163 per cent between these two dates. Groundnuts show the highest 
quantity increase (1767 per cent) but this is due to the fact that 
very little of this commodity was being exported in the base period, 
so that in absolute terms the increase in groundnuts exports has 
not been impressive at all. On the other hand robusta coffee and 
hides and skins are exports whose contribution has been small 
simply because no marked increase has taken place in their export. 
In 1949/50 reasonable quantities of these products were being 
exported, but by 1962/63 robusta coffee exports had increased by 
only 5 per cent, and hides and skins by 48 per cent. 
In between these extreme positions has been the performance 
of cashew nuts, meat and tea. These are commodities the export 
of which has been rising fast, and which were also increasing their 
share in the value of total exports relative to other commodities. 
* Assuming of course that the commodity in question did not increase its 
share in total exports primarily by enjoying favourable prices. In such a case 
its increased importance in the total value of exports would do little to enhance 
the overall quantity index. 
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The volume of cashew nuts exports has gone up by 918 per cent, 
tea by 721 per cent, and meat and meat preparations by 433 per 
cent; inspection of the detailed tables will reveal that in each case 
there has been a more or less persistent annual increase in quantity*. 
It can be said that the development of these three commodities 
has been the medium through which Tanganyika's agricultural 
exports have achieved some degree of diversification since at the S' 
same time no major export was being dropped altogether. -0 
The experience of Kenya has been comparable to that of Tanga- n 
nyika in the sense that a marked increase in most exports has been .0 
achieved over this period. The most remarkable increase has been 
that of arabica coffee exports, but the increase of tea and meat 
exports has also been very impressive. Arabica coffee exports 
have increased at an amazing rate such that in 1952 coffee overtook ® 
sisal as Kenya's leading export and has kept this position to this >1 
day. This rapid increase in coffee exports has also been associated 
with an increasing share of the crop coming from African small- ® 
holdings, following the government's policy of encouraging Africans 
to grow high value crops on consolidated and planned holdings. 
In the same way increased meat exports have, in large part, resulted f 
from a deliberate government policy to settle European ex-service-
men on big farms under assisted farmer schemes and to encourage 
them to practise large-scale ranching or mixed farming in suitable ( 
areas. 
Crops which showed only moderate increases were sisal, cotton j t 
and hides and skins. It will be shown in the next section that there >[ 
were price difficulties with regard to sisal, and that this probably ^ 
explains the slow rise in the quantity exported. In the case of hides 
and skins there is the fact that more hides and skins have been "J 
utilised locally, mainly for the manufacture of footwear. The failure ^ 
to increase cotton exports was perhaps unfortunate since there 
were still suitable areas in which the crop could be grown at fairly 
remunerative prices: in 1964 the government seems to have woken 
up to this fact and now plans on increasing cotton production 7 
almost tenfold by 1970. 11 
Uganda's biggest achievement over this period has been the 
remarkable increase in her exports of robusta coffee. Table III.9 
shows that the volume of robusta coffee exports has gone up by 
* The detailed tables are not appended but they can be obtained from the 
Makerere Institute of Social Research, P.O. Box 16022, Kampala. 
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406 per cent over the entire period. Other notable increases are 
arabica coffee (545 per cent), and tea (479 per cent). The failure 
of cotton exports to increase at all—in fact export quantities fell 
by 31 per cent between 1949/50 and 1962/63—is the most unfor-
tunate feature of the whole period from the point of view of the 
economy as a whole. The highest quantity exported in this period 
was in 1954 when the quantity index stood at 137, which was not 
much higher than the 1949 index of 136. (In this regard a comparison 
with much earlier years would give a quantity index of cotton 
exports of 140 for 1937/8 against 115 for 1963 or 122 for 1961 
which was a fairly normal year).* Thus increased coffee exports 
have to a large extent been at the expense of cotton exports, which 
may account for Uganda's slow growth rate of agricultural exports, 
and indeed of total exports. This is in contrast with Kenya and 
Tanganyika which were able to increase the quantity exported of all 
their leading exports, so that increased exports of other commodities 
went to augment the overall quantity indices. 
The fact that coffee has to a large extent displaced cotton would 
imply one of two things: either resources (mainly labour) were 
fully employed such that increased production of coffee inevitably 
led to less production of cotton, or else the relative profitability of 
coffee to cotton made a switch of resources to coffee production 
inevitable, and then none of the unemployed or underemployed 
resources were attracted to cotton production. Applied to Buganda, 
the latter hypothesis seems to fit the facts much better since large 
parts of Buganda are suitable for producing both cotton and coffee, 
and it is here that the greatest amount of substitution has taken 
place. Buganda used to be a major producer of cotton when about 
one-third of the total acreage in Uganda in 1951 was planted 
there, but this has dwindled almost steadily since then as figures 
in Table III. 11 will show: her share over the last few years has been 
between one-quarter and one-sixth. At the same time expansion 
of cotton acreages outside Buganda has been slow, which is not 
surprising as over many parts of Uganda cotton is regarded as 
* Cotton production in the 1964/5 and 1965/6 seasons has already exceeded 
the 1937/8 record output. This is only partly attributable to the very heavy 
investment in tractors and group farms which took place in 1964. The main 
factors seem to have been the relatively high producer prices of these years 
coupled with the widespread use of subsidised insecticide. Some 20,000 bales of 
cotton is being utilised locally by the Nyanza Textiles factory at Jinja, so that 
some of the decline in exports would be due to this fact. 
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the 'poor man's crop' even when compared to some other crops 
besides coffee. It will also be recalled from figures provided in 
Chapter 2 that cotton farmers have contributed huge funds to 
development expenditure within the public sector, whereas 
coffee farmers have contributed relatively little: in one way or 
another cotton farmers have been "forced" to give up about £41 
million compared to £7.6 million by coffee farmers. 
The rapid switch away from cotton has been aided by the fact 
that cotton production commitments are made every year, and 
therefore it is easier to pull out of this line of production at the end 
of any one year without incurring losses than it is with coffee, 
for instance. 
Difficulties of comparison over t ime 
A certain difficulty arises when comparing quantity and price 
changes of products which may change in quality over long periods. 
This danger is inherent in the Laspeyre's method of constructing 
quantity indices when a given set of prices is applied to the quantities 
of exports for all other years without taking into account the 
quality element. In a situation where there has been an improve-
ment in quality over the years the quantity indices would thus 
not truly reflect the total effort being expended to produce output, 
and similarly price indices will to this extent have to be adjusted 
to take these quality changes into account. It has generally been 
observed that this danger is very small with respect to agricultural 
products already established, since quality changes are minimal 
as compared to manufactured products. But it is impossible to 
ignore such changes in developing countries in which new crops 
are being introduced and generalised to many small producers 
since there is often a choice of concentrating the extension staff 
and funds available on encouraging either quantity or quality. 
In the case of Kenya rigid controls to ensure high quality for her 
coffee have delayed the very rapid expansion in coffee exports which 
would have taken place had that government adopted the attitude 
of the Uganda government. This is true even if it is admitted that 
arabica coffee generally requires higher standards of husbandry 
than robusta. This problem becomes more serious when we are 
looking at quantity changes for individual crops rather than at 
agricultural exports as a whole, since not all crops will have actually 
experienced an improvement in quality and perhaps there is a 
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certain element of compensation with some commodities deterio-
rating in quality while others are improving. 
This problem apart, there is another problem of comparing 
quantity indices of a product which is a composite of many individual 
commodities. In the present study this would affect products 
such as meat, hides and skins, pyrethrum and wattle bark. In the 
case of hides and skins, and meat, many different kinds are lumped 
together, and the prices for individual commodities within the 
mix are not the same so that, in effect, some changes in both the 
quantity and price indices could be due to changes in the proportions 
of the various items in the agglomeration we have called hides 
and skins or meat and meat preparations. The difficulty with pyre-
thrum and wattle is similar except that there is another problem 
with the processed and unprocessed products. In the data used 
in this analysis pyrethrum flowers are combined with the extract, 
and in the same way wattle bark is combined with the extract from 
the bark. Both forms of these products have been exported almost 
each year until Tanganyika stopped exporting pyrethrum flowers 
in 1962. As the years progressed, the processed product has come 
to dominate the scene. Although it was not possible to investigate 
every individual item, as already suggested, the major difficulty 
arises only when we are discussing quantity and price changes 
separately for these particular products; the overall indices are 
very little affected. In spite of these difficulties there is enough 
evidence to show that meat exports have increased from Kenya 
and Tanganyika, and that their prices have actually been favourable. 
The quantity of hides and skins exported has probably not risen 
by very much in any of the three countries, while that for wattle 
has definitely fallen. It would be very difficult to make such catego-
rical statements in the case of pyrethrum exports from Kenya without 
further research. 
Trends in prices 1949/50 to 1962/3 
There arc three main reasons why prices for agricultural exports 
are of particular concern to the East African countries, as indeed 
they are to all developing countries dependent on the export of 
a small range of primary products. First of all, and with very few 
exceptions such as cotton, agricultural production is characterised 
by long periods of gestation such that production does not readily 
respond to price changes. Thus when sisal prices rise it takes at 
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least four years before increased exports can be forthcoming from 
new plantations: in the short run, which in this case is more than 
three years, all that can be done is either to over-cut existing bushes 
(with deleterious consequences on future productivity) or to meet the 
extra demand from accumulated stocks. The capacity to carry 
stocks in these countries is so low that increased demand is unlikely 
to be met from stocks, and the first method of meeting such demand 
is restricted to only a few crops. The typical response to rising 
prices is to plant more. In the reverse case, namely when prices 
are falling, it is equally difficult to adjust the supply to such condi-
tions: in fact there are many reasons to suggest that the response 
will be to increase the volume of production in order to maintain 
incomes. The result of such movements is that an efficient allocation 
of resources is difficult to achieve even in the long run unless some 
form of long-term price forecasting and planning is practised; 
after all the long run is made up of short run adjustments. 
The second reason for worrying about the prices of agricultural 
exports is that the East African countries sell their agricultural 
commodities in highly competitive markets in which their own 
control over prices is at best marginal, and for the most part they 
have to take the ruling prices for granted. In East Africa the only 
prices over which these countries have some control are pyrethrum 
in the case of Kenya, and sisal in the case of Tanganyika; and then 
both these commodities are threatened by synthetic substitutes 
in their major markets. For all the other major exports it would be 
true to say that the East African countries produce such small 
quantities in relation to world production, or face such keen compe-
tition, that the level of exportable quantities from East Africa has 
very little effect on world prices. 
Putting these two things together we get the third reason for 
worrying about agricultural exports prices. Since in the short run 
there is very little that these countries can clo to change the volume 
of their agricultural exports, their foreign exchange earnings come to 
depend on the prices they receive. This becomes really serious when 
prices are falling: it being taken for granted that increased foreign 
exchange earnings, even when unexpected, are always a good thing. 
Of course the size of foreign exchange earnings is really a function 
of both.the price and the quantity sold; but as the quantity changes 
only slowly, it is the price which usually determines the fluctuations 
in the size of these earnings. Thus Uganda's export earnings rocketed 
to exceedingly high levels in 1963 and 1964 because of the recovery 
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of prices during those two years. Since the level of export earnings 
affects the rate of growth of these economies in ways already 
discussed, price movements affect the general state of the economies 
significantly. Measures which could be taken to lessen the impact 
of such price fluctuations are many and varied: they include schemes 
for diversifying a country's agricultural exports, and we discuss 
these in the last chapter. 
For all agricultural exports taken together it has been Kenya 
which has had a favourable trend of prices in the sense that her 
price index in 1962/3 stood 25 per cent above what it was in 1949/50. 
This contrasts with Uganda's price index which fell by 3 per cent 
over the same period, while Tanganyika's index ended the period 
at the same level as at the beginning—(if we exclude the price 
rise of 1964). The shortcoming of comparing price changes just 
between two periods is that the percentage changes, in a very 
important sense, could depend on the dates selected: for instance 
if we had taken 1949 and 1964 Uganda would have had a more 
favourable price change than Tanganyika. Judicious selection of 
what can be regarded as normal years may to some extent eliminate 
this bias; but in a situation where countries are exporting different 
commodities, what is a normal year for one country or commodity 
need not be a normal year for another. However, in this case inspec-
tion of the appended graphs (Chart III.8) will also confirm the 
assertion that Kenya has had a better price trend than either of 
her two neighbours. Not only this, but these graphs also bring out 
the relatively mild fluctuations in Kenya's price index as compared 
to that of Uganda and Tanganyika. Since 1952, when Kenya ceased 
being heavily dependent on sisal exports, her price index has been 
fairly steady. This is yet another attribute of the relatively greater 
diversification of her agricultural exports. 
Individual commodities which have contributed to Kenya's 
favourable price trend have been coffee, tea, pyrethrum and meat. 
In the case of coffee it has been the maintenance of a high level of 
husbandry on the farm which has given a good reputation to 
Kenya's coffee, and has enabled her coffee to maintain favourable 
prices in the face of declining prices for coffee from other parts 
of the world. Between 1949/50 and 1962/3 there was a 16 per cent 
increase in Kenya's coffee prices, and should this appear to be a 
modest increase, it should be remembered that over the same period 
Uganda's arabica coffee prices fell by 14 per cent, and those for 
robusta fell by 11 per cent. Commenting on the coffee industry 
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nuts. Also she suffered a price fall for her arabica coffee of 14 
per cent in spite of the fact that her neighbours secured price 
increases, 16 per cent for Kenya and 49 per cent for Tanganyika for 
the same commodity. This is related in large part to the organisation 
of the arabica coffee industry in Uganda which has been ex-
periencing great difficulties in maintaining the quality of the 
product. A study of the industry has been made by J. W. F. Rowe, 
and this suggests that over this period the many problems of 
organisation connected with the transfer of the running of the 
industry from civil servants to co-operative societies have accounted 
largely for this drop in quality.3 By comparison the arabica coffee 
industries in Kenya and Tanganyika have been run efficiently. 
Crops which have been at the bottom of the list are sisal, robusta 
coffee and hides and skins. Cotton has also done badly in Kenya 
and Uganda. As already pointed out Uganda is heavily dependent 
on robusta coffee and cotton, and the fact that both these had 
adverse price trends over this period accounts for a fall of 3 per 
cent in her price index. In all three countries sisal prices fell, and 
in Kenya and Uganda price declines of hides and skins were more 
pronounced at -28 per cent and -19 per cent respectively, 
whereas Tanganyika's prices rose by 10 per cent. 
A combination of favourable prices with a large increase in 
quantity of agricultural exports gave Kenya the highest increase 
of value of agricultural exports, and incidentally of total exports 
as well. Table III.2 shows that the value of her agricultural exports 
rose by 196 per cent between 1949/50 and 1962/3, and that total 
exports went up by 190 per cent. This contrasts with Uganda's 
position whose value of agricultural exports went up by a mere 
65 per cent during this period in spite of a reasonable recovery 
in 1963. It was really in 1964 that Uganda's exports took a sharp 
turn upward, although this trend started in 1963. The value of 
Tanganyika's agricultural exports went up by 153 per cent and that 
for total exports by 167 per cent (Table III.4). The fact that total 
exports rose more than agricultural exports is also indicative of 
the observation made in the first chapter (p. 2) that over this period 
Tanganyika has reduced her dependence on the export of these 
commodities, while in the case of Kenya which had become more 
dependent on these commodities, the value of her agricultural 
exports went up faster than that of total exports. 
The maintenance of a high level of export earnings requires 
that both volume of exports and prices be taken into account. 
Table III.I 
EAST AFRICA: AGRICULTURAL EXPORTS* INDICES—1946-1966 
1960-1962=100 
Kenya Uganda Tanganyika East Africa 
1 
Value Quantity Price Value Quantity Price Value Quantity Price Value Quantity Price 
Year Index Index Index Index Index Index Index Index Index Index Index Index 
1949 29 48 61 62 67 94 41 43 97 44 52 85 
1950 47 45 104 77 65 119 49 42 119 58 50 115 
1951 64 45 140 131 70 187 90 49 184 96 55 175 
1952 70 58 120 129 72 179 94 58 162 99 63 157 
1953 52 49 106 88 65 135 72 60 120 71 58 122 
1954 55 50 109 109 77 141 74 64 115 80 65 124 
1955 74 64 116 116 81 143 71 69 102 87 72 121 
1956 83 77 117 110 85 130 89 83 108 95 80 118 
1957 75 71 105 123 89 138 75 77 97 91 79 115 
1958 83 84 98 122 94 130 79 86 91 94 88 107 
1959 93 89 105 108 97 112 85 89 95 95 92 104 
1960 99 99 100 105 105 100 107 103 104 104 103 101 
1961 97 101 96 100 101 99 92 94 98 96 98 98 
1962 104 100 104 96 94 102 100 103 97 100 99 101 
1963 120 116 103 134 127 106 129 109 118 128 117 109 
1964 124 112 111 164 120 137 143 115 124 145 116 125 
1965 115 108 106 152 130 117 121 116 104 130 119 109 
1966 149 143 104 167 141 118 155 153 101 157 147 107 
* Agricultural Exports as defined in the notes to Table II. 1. 
Note: Italics indicate figures against which percentage charges are calculated in tables. 
KENYA: C H A N G E S IN T O T A L A N D AGRICULTURAL E X P O R T S IN SELECTED SUB-PERIODS 1949/50—1952/64 
1949/50 (Av.) 1954 1958 1962/63 (Av.) 1949/50—1962/63 
Total Exports £"000 
Per cent Change From Previous Date 
Agricultural Exports £'000 
Per cent Change From Previous Date 
Agricultural Exports at 1960-62 Prices £'000 
Per cent Change From Previous Date* 
Price Index 1960-62=100 
Per cent Change From Previous Date 
14,073 
10,818 
13,275 
83 
20,260 29,300 
+ 4 4 
15,642 
+ 4 5 
14,365 
+ 8 
109 
+31 
+45 
23,617 
+ 51 
24,071 
+67 
98 
- 1 0 
40,873 
+ 3 9 
32,044 
+ 3 6 
30,876 
+28 
104 
+ 6 
+ 190 
+ 196 
+ 132 
+ 25 
: Changes in this variable can be regarded as reflecting changes in the quantity of exports 
Table 111.3 
U G A N D A : C H A N G E S IN T O T A L A N D AGRICULTURAL E X P O R T S IN SELECTED SUB-PERIODS 1949/50—1962/63 
1949/50 (Av.) 1954 1958 1962/63 (A v.) 1949/50—1962/63 
Total Exports £"000 
Per cent Change From Previous Date 
Agricultural Exports £'000 
Per cent Change From Previous Date 
Agricultural Exports at 1960-62 Prices £'000 
Per cent Change From Previous Date* 
Price Index 1960-62=100 
Per cent Change From Previous Date 
26,051 40,575 45,409 44,555 
— + 5 6 + 12 - 2 + 56 
23,348 36,582 40,848 38,411 — 
— +57 + 12 - 5 + 65 
21,984 25,909 31,425 36,859 — 
+ 18 +21 + 17 + 68 
107 141 130 104 — 
— + 32 - 8 - 2 0 - 3 
* For notes see Table III.2. 
Table 111.4 
T A N G A N Y I K A : C H A N G E S IN T O T A L A N D AGRICULTURAL E X P O R T S IN SELECTED SUB-PERIODS 
1949/50—1962/63 
Total Exports £'000 
Per cent Change From Previous Date 
Agricultural Exports £'000 
Per cent Change From Previous Date 
Agricultural Exports at 1960-62 Prices £'000 
Per cent Change From Previous Date* 
Price Index 1960-62=100 
Per cent Change From Previous Date 
* For notes see Table III.2. 
1949/50 (Av.) 1954 1958 1962/63 (Av.) 1949/50—1962/63 
21,501 
17,080 
15,882 
108 
36,251 
+ 69 
27,934 
+ 6 3 
24,281 
+ 5 3 
115 
+ 6 
41,707 
+ 15 
29,680 
+ 6 
32,466 
+ 34 
91 
- 2 0 
57,397 
+ 38 
43,221 
+ 4 6 
39,981 
+ 2 3 
108 
+ 19 
167 
153 
152 
—0 
Table 111.5 
KENYA: COMPARISON O F THREE DIFFERENT Q U A N T I T Y 
INDICES FOR AGRICULTURAL EXPORTS 
U) (2) 
Laspeyres (1) Adjusted For Linked 
Quantity Index 1963 Sisal Prices Index 
Year 1960-62=100 1960-62=100 1961 = 100 
1949 . . 48 49 38 
1950 . . 45 46 44 
1951 . . 45 47 44 
1952 . . 58 59 54 
1953 . . 49 50 45 
1954 . . 50 51 47 
1955 . . 64 64 65 
1956 . . 77 71 73 
1957 . . 71 71 69 
1958 . . 84 83 81 
1959 . . 89 89 84 
1960 . . 99 99 98 
1961 . . 101 101 100 
1962 . . 100 100 103 
1963 .. 116 116 116 
1964 . . 112 111 100 
In 1963 Kenya's sisal prices were 53 per cent above the 1960-62 level. 
Table 111.6 
U G A N D A : COMPARISON OF THREE DIFFERENT QUANTITY 
INDICES FOR AGRICULTURAL EXPORTS 
V) (2) 
Laspeyres (1) Adjusted For Linked 
Quantity Index 1963 Robusta Index 
Year 1960-62= 100 Coffee Prices 1962=100 
1960-62=100 
1949 .. 67 61 60 
1950 65 60 58 
1951 . . 70 65 65 
1952 . . 72 67 66 
1953 65 61 59 
1954 . . 77 71 69 
1955 . . 81 76 84 
1956 85 81 85 
1957 . . 89 87 93 
1958 94 90 96 
1959 97 94 101 
1960 . . 105 105 115 
1961 101 99 110 
1962 . . 94 96 100 
1963 . . 127 121 126 
1964 .. 120 120 125 
In 1963 Uganda's robusta coffee prices were 35 per cent above their level in 
1960-62. 
Table 111.7 
T A N G A N Y I K A : C O M P A R I S O N O F THREE DIFFERENT Q U A N T I T Y 
INDICES FOR AGRICULTURAL E X P O R T S 
V ) (2) 
Laspeyres (1) Adjusted For Linked 
Year Quantity Index 1963 Sisal Prices Index 
1960-62= 100 1960-62=100 1962=100 
1949 . . 43 46 53 
1950 . . 42 44 48 
1951 . . 49 52 56 
1952 . . 58 61 65 
1953 . . 60 63 68 
1954 . . 64 67 73 
1955 . . 69 72 76 
1956 . . 83 84 93 
1957 . . 77 79 81 
1958 . . 86 . 87 90 
1959 . . 89 91 88 
1960 . . 103 102 99 
1961 . . 94 94 91 
1962 . . 103 103 100 
1963 . . 109 108 108 
1964 . . 115 113 114 
In 1963 Tanganyika's sisal prices were 47 per cent above their level in 1960-62 
Table 111.8 
KENYA: PERCENTAGE C H A N G E S IN VALUE, Q U A N T I T Y A N D PRICE O F INDIVIDUAL AGRICULTURAL 
EXPORTS 1949/50—1962/63(1) 
(V=Value, Q=Quantity, P=Price) 
1949/50—1954 1954—58 1958—1962/63 1949/50—62/63 
Ar. Coffee 
(28.8) 
V Q P V Q P V Q P V Q P 
. . +128 + 24 +90 + 82 + 131 - 21 + 4 + 35 - 2 2 + 339 +281 + 16 
Tea 
(12.5) 
. . +101 + 39 +43 + 56 + 67 - 8 + 69 + 74 - 2 + 429 +308 + 31 
Sisal 
(12.1) 
. . - 41 - 7 - 3 6 + 9 + 29 - 17 + 116 + 43 + 86 + 72 + 73 - 2 
Pyrethrum** . . 
(8.5) 
0.9 0 .2 0 +443 + 91 + 188 + 71 - 10 + 90 + 736 + 75 +448 
Meat 
(6.4) 
.'.' +102 + 115 - 9 +255 + 166 + 35 + 117 + .49 + 49 + 1462 +208 + 64 
Hides & Skins 
(4.3) 
. . - 8 - 14 + 9 - 29 - 3 - 27 + 24 + 38 - 10 - 18 + 16 + 2S 
Wattle 
(2.0) 
. . + 87 + 14 + 61 - 41 - 30 - 16 - 25 - 35 +22 - 17 - 48 + 64 
Cotton 
(1.8) 
. . +234 + 194 + 12 - 36 - 19 - 20 - 15 - 15 — + 83 + 103 - 10 
Maize* 
(1.1) 
— — — + 84 + 90 - 3 - 31 - 26 - 7 + 238 +326 - 7 
Cashew Nuts* + 47 + 102 - 2 7 (0.7) 
Ground Nuts* • • — — — — — — + 44 + 42 - 1 — — — 
* Large Percentage changes due to small initial values are excluded from the table. 
* * 1950 is used instead of 1949/50 average. 
(1) Commodities are listed in order of importance of their value and the figures in brackets after each product indicate the 
percentage of the value of total exports constituted by the particular commodity for the period 1960-62. 
Table 111.9 
U G A N D A : PERCENTAGE CHANGES IN VALUE, Q U A N T I T Y A N D PRICE O F INDIVIDUAL AGRICULTURAL 
EXPORTS—1949/50 1962/63'D 
1949150-1954 
V Q P V 
1954-58 
Q P V 
1958-1962/63 
Q P V 
1949/50-62/63 
Q P 
Robusta Coffee 
(36.9) 
Cotton 
(33.7) 
Arabica Coffee 
(6.1) 
Tea 
(4.2) 
Hides & Skins 
(2.6) 
Ground Nuts* 
(1.2) 
Sisal 
. . +135 + 33 + 80 +66 + 112 - 2 2 + 12 + 75 - 3 7 337 406 - 1 1 
. . + 22 + 6 + 13 - 1 4 - 1 - 1 1 - 38 - 34 - 4 - 34 - 3 1 - 4 
. . +222 + 121 +71 + 1 + 36 - 1 6 + 47 + 116 - 3 2 386 545 - 1 4 
. . +306 + 148 +40 + 3 + 9 - 5 + 106 +111 - 1 765 470 +32 
. . + 22 + 14 - 3 8 + 2 
- 3 7 
+ 25 
- 4 
- 4 3 
- 3 4 
+ 45 
- 23 
+ 56 
- 26 
- 8 
+ 8 
81 122 - 1 9 
. . - 65 - 44 - 3 6 - 2 6 - 26 0 + 78 + 1 +81 - 53 - 31 - 4 
* Large percentage changes due to small initial values are excluded from the table. 
(1) For notes see Table III.8. 
T a b l e 111.10 
T A N G A N Y I K A : P E R C E N T A G E C H A N G E S I N V A L U E , Q U A N T I T Y A N D PRICE O F I N D I V I D U A L 
A G R I C U L T U R A L E X P O R T S 1949/50—1962/63(1) 
1949/50-1954 1954-58 1958-1962163 1949150-62163 
V Q P V Q P V Q P V Q P 
Sisal . . - 5 + 33 - 30 - 5 + 19 - 2 0 + 85 + 9 + 7 2 + 67 + 74 - 4 
(29.0) 
Cotton . . + 92 + 33 + 40 + 116 + 164 - 1 9 + 25 + 26 + 0 + 417 + 344 + M 
(14.9) 
Ar. Coffee . . + 3 9 7 + 89 + 168 - 22 + 9 - 2 8 + 2 + 27 - 2 3 + 282 + 163 + 49 
(12.3) 
Meat* .. — — — + 10 - 4 + 15 + 165 + 109 + 16 +4176 + 433 +226 
(4.1) 
Cashew Nuts . . + 2 9 0 +227 + 28 + 96 + 92 + 1 + 101 + 62 + 2 7 + 1427 + 918 + 64 
(4.0) 
Hides & Skins . . + 53 + 32 + 18 - 22 + 24 + 3 + 35 + 58 - 1 4 + 58 - 48 + 10 
(3.3) 
Tea* .. — — — + 25 + 35 - 7 + 133 + 51 + 55 + 1878 + 721 + 135 
(2.6) 
Ground Nuts* .. — — — +328 + 3 9 6 - 1 5 - 25 - 27 + 2 + 2048 + 1767 + 11 
(1.1) 
Robusta Coffee . . +178 + 25 + 126 - 39 - 17 - 2 2 - 33 + 1 - 3 4 + 13 + 5 + . 8 
(1.0) 
Wattle* vv ailiC . . 
(0.7) 
Maize* .. — — — — — — - 3 7 . 5 - 9 1 . 5 + 3 2 — — 
(10.5) 
Pyrethrum 0 + 13 - 14 + 55 + 61 - 3 — — — 
* Large percentage changes due to small initial values are excluded from the table. 
(1) For notes see Table III.8. 
Table III.11 
C O T T O N ACREAGES IN U G A N D A 1948-62 
( thousand acres) 
U) (2) (2) as % 
Year Total All Uganda Buganda of (1) 
1948 1,559.9 476.7 30.6 
1949 1,628.5 527.9 32.4 
1950 1,490.7 508.1 34.1 
1951 1,514.2 416.5 27.5 
1952 1,472.6 341.7 23.2 
1953 1,611.2 398.1 24.7 
1954 1,738.8 431.9 24.8 
1955 1,585.5 373.6 23.6 
1956 1,568.5 346.0 22.1 
1957 1,617.0 348.3 21.5 
1958 2,014.0 384.0 19.1 
1959 1,564.7 325.2 20.8 
1960 1,516.0 250.2 16.5 
1961 2,072.1 458.9 22.1 
1962 1,803.5 277.9 15.4 
Source Annual Reports of Agricultural Dept. 
Table 111.12 
PRICE TRENDS FOR SOME COMMODITIES 1949/50—1962/63 
Percentage Change 
Commodity Kenya Uganda Tanganyika 
Meat & Meat Preparations . . 64 — 226 
Tea 31 32 135 
Cashew Nuts — — 64 
Arabica Coffee ;; i6 - 1 4 49 
Cotton - 1 0 - 4 14 
Groundnuts — — 11 
Hides & Skins - 2 8 - 1 9 10 
Robusta Coffee — - 1 1 8 
Sisal - 2 - 4 - 4 
Maize - 7 — — 
Figures are taken from Tables III.8, III.9 and III. 10. 
For reasons expressed in the text it was considered unwise to include wattle 
bark and extract and pyrethrum in this ranking. 
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In the short run price movements are more important than quantity 
changes in affecting the total value of exports: changes in volume 
of agricultural exports occur slowly, if exception is made for the 
effects of the weather and for new harvests resulting from heavy 
planting in a particular period in the past. Price movements, 
however, occur abruptly and in both directions. Given a free market 
in agricultural commodities, the effects of fluctuating prices can 
be abated by having a more diversified range of agricultural exports, 
while the long-run objective must be to increase the volume of 
exports if high levels of export earnings are (o be achieved. In 
this chapter attention has been focused on the behaviour of both 
price and volume over a long period in order to separate the in-
fluence of each variable on the total value of agricultural exports. 
The main conclusion of this discussion is that over this long period 
volume changes have been more important in affecting the total 
value of agricultural exports than price changes, and as one would 
expect, volume changes have been in one direction. On the other 
hand, for Uganda, prices have fallen while they have risen in the 
case of Kenya's main agricultural exports. 
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FUTURE PRICE TRENDS AND DEVELOPMENT PLANS 
IN EAST AFRICA 
I Some preliminary considerations 
From the viewpoint of agricultural planning in East Africa 
the kind of information most urgently required concerns the future 
prices of a wide range of commodities whose production in East 
Africa is technically possible. This is largely because the East 
African countries are for the most part small producers in the 
markets in which they sell their export commodities,* and can 
therefore plan to export as much as they produce without paying 
too much attention to the effect of their own output on world 
prices. Other things being equal, crops which it is profitable to 
export now will become even more profitable to export in the future 
if their prices rise. In a world free from planning constraints, 
production for export would be carried to that point where marginal 
returns to factors of production are equalised as between domestic 
production and production for export. Thus when the export 
prices of a commodity change, there is a need not only to alter 
the composition of exports but also to reallocate production factors 
between production for export and production for the domestic 
market. 
It will not be possible in this study to hazard suggestions as 
to the proper allocation of resources between production for 
export and production for the domestic market. This is because, 
with the possible exception of large-scale estate production, there 
is virtually no information regarding net returns to factors of 
production engaged in the agricultural sector in East Africa.** 
* Exceptions in East Africa would be sisal in Tanganyika, pyrethrum in 
Kenya and robusta coffee in Uganda. 
** A number of studies in this field have been launched at University 
College, Nairobi and Makerere University College. Their results are eagerly 
awaited. 
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For small-scale farmers the only reliable information we have 
concerning their economic transactions concerns the revenues 
from exportable commodities, particularly where the commodity 
in question is exported through a statutory marketing board. 
One can only make some guesses to the effect that perhaps too 
much emphasis has been placed on export commodities, especially 
in Uganda and Tanganyika, at a time when these countries were 
not faced with a foreign exchange problem, and that this has been 
done at the expense of developing and improving marketing 
arrangements on the domestic scene, not only within individual 
countries but within the East African common market as a whole. 
On certain assumptions there seem to be many more profitable 
opportunities to be exploited in this sphere than are perhaps 
realised.1 
In future, however, foreign exchange earnings may impose a 
serious constraint on development as development plans become 
more ambitious, and as resources are channelled more into produc-
tion to satisfy domestic demand rather than the export market. 
In such a situation it may be possible to expand production for 
export to a point where net returns are much below those which 
could be obtained if such resources were employed in satisfying 
the domestic market. In effect we would be putting a premium 
on foreign exchange in computing profitability of different projects 
because of the limiting nature of foreign exchange on development. 
If foreign exchange targets are known, what we will have to work 
out is the combination of exportable commodities which will enable 
us to achieve such a target with the least absorption of resources, 
in which case considerations of profitability in industries serving 
the domestic market would be largely irrelevant except when the 
divergence in net returns is really large. Information required for 
such an exercise would be the course of future costs of production 
of different export crops in relation to the prices at which these 
crops could be sold. Price projections presented in this study are 
intended to throw some light on the revenue side of the exercise 
only, without saying anything on the cost of production side. 
By and large agricultural export prices on the world market 
depend on two things: the forces of demand and supply and institu-
tional arrangements which have international repercussions. 
For instance, the recovery in robusta coffee prices over the last 
two years is attributable in part to natural calamities in Brazil's 
coffee growing areas, and partly to the successful conclusion of the 
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International Coffee Agreement. Institutional arrangements designed 
to maintain, and sometimes to raise the prices of agricultural 
commodities, have been strongly recommended by the United 
Nations Conference on Trade and Development which took place 
in Geneva in 1964. 
The information on the market prospects for the several commo-
dities examined in this chapter is based mainly on various 
documents recently published by the Food and Agriculture Organiz-
ation which are listed at the end of this chapter2, 3 ' 4i 5- It is import-
ant to note from the very beginning that although a few countries 
may benefit by acting on information provided in these documents, 
if many countries were to draw up their plans on the basis of these 
projections and the plans were successful, the projections themselves 
could turn out to be wrong. Projections of supplies are the most 
difficult to make because their accuracy depends on the way indivi-
dual countries draw up their plans, and the success with which they 
implement such plans. It is only possible to make tentative guesses 
about these decisions in advance. And then there are unpredictable 
events such as the outbreak of wars which, while they themselves 
may be short-lived, are capable of exerting lasting effects on the 
production and consumption of certain commodities. Nevertheless 
plans must be made on the basis of the best information available 
so as to increase the probability of being right; certainty about 
the future is unattainable. 
2 Meat and meat preparations 
Meat consumption is highly responsive to income and price 
changes. We find that even in North America meat consumption 
has not yet reached saturation point. The United States has, for 
example, of late become a net importer of meat as to about 2 per 
cent or 3 per cent of its total consumption and, in Western Europe, 
Italy, the United Kingdom and West Germany are expected to 
increase their meat consumption pretty fast over the coming years. 
Production is unlikely to keep up with demand in these countries 
and even with increased supplies from France and the Netherlands 
to the other Common Market countries there would still be room 
for imports from third countries. The greatest obstacle to increased 
exports from countries such as East Africa (in the event that they 
do not succeed in becoming associate members of the Community) 
will be the heavy levies imposed on Such imports by the European 
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Common Market countries in order to protect their own farmers. 
Within developing countries themselves, production is likely 
to fall far short of demand, and internal prices are likely to rise 
steadily since it is unlikely that these countries will be prepared 
to release enough foreign exchange in order to import meat from 
outside. It is interesting to note in this respect that Kenya, which 
had succeeded over the last few years in establishing an export 
trade in meat and meat preparations, not only with the outside 
world but also within the East African Common Market, is now 
unsure, apparently, whether her exports of meat and dairy products 
in 1970 will not be less than what she exported in 1962.* 
Meat would have the brightest prospects in the field of agricultural 
exports from East Africa but for certain institutional barriers to 
the movement of meat products internationally. The particular 
meat products likely to enjoy these favourable price conditions 
are beef and poultry meat. It looks as though the most appropriate 
form in which to export beef would be as canned or highly processed 
meat if discriminatory tariff policies in developed countries could 
be overcome. As it is, processed meat faces high tariffs in developed 
countries because it is regarded as a manufactured article, and at 
the same time fresh meat is discriminated against on account of 
disease. There seems to be a lot of room for negotiation in this field. 
The major determinants of demand for meat within the develop-
ing countries will be the growth of incomes in the future: the in-
come elasticity of demand for meat being high at low levels of income. 
In the developed countries demand is likely to rise fast under the 
influence of population increases, although increases in income 
are going to affect the demand in some countries, especially in 
Western Europe. 
Broadly speaking, the bright price prospects for meat will be a 
continuation of the observed trends of the recent past as far as 
East Africa's exports are concerned. It was noted in Chapter 3 
that meat has had the best price trend over the period covered 
by this study, and that Kenya and Tanganyika have benefited 
greatly from expansion of their exports of this commodity during 
this period. 
* The Kenya Development Plan 1964-1970 contained figures indicating 
that there will be a significant fall in the export of meat and dairy products. 
The revised Plan, however, gives figures showing slight increases of these 
products between 1964 and 1970, and, unlike the earlier Plan, avoids mention 
of the likelihood of consumption of these commodities rising faster than 
production. 
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East Africa's plans for meat production 
For the East African region as a whole the United Nations 
Special Fund has agreed to sponsor a livestock development plan.* 
Such a document should throw light on a number of problems 
relating to production and trade in livestock products within the 
East African Common Market as well as for export. At the moment 
there are three major problems facing the livestock industry in 
East Africa. First, there is the high level of protection afforded 
to this industry against outside competition in the interests of 
Kenya farmers. Secondly, there is the problem of quantitative 
restrictions of output practised by Kenya's statutory boards coupled 
with discriminatory pricing practices resulting in higher prices 
being charged to East African consumers while accepting much 
lower prices on the export market. Both these problems have 
generated a lot of heat within the East African Common Market, 
and have led in turn to the third problem facing the industry here; 
namely the development of the livestock industry in the other two 
countries at very high cost, in order to avoid dependence on Kenya 
farmers. This trend has been most noticeable in Uganda where a 
lot of money has been earmarked for tick control and improvement 
of water supplies for the development of the livestock industry. 
Perhaps the livestock industry would have been pushed in Uganda 
and Tanzania in any case, but the high cost of meat and dairy 
products arising out of the pricing policy of Kenya farmers has 
given the move an added impetus. The objective of official policy 
in Uganda is to make Uganda self-sufficient in livestock products 
by increasing the production of meat and dairy products fairly 
fast.6 It is proposed, for instance, to set up a meat commission to 
control all major abattoirs and to purchase all cattle surplus to 
internal requirements of individual districts. Other measures 
include the control of diseases, the establishment of ranches through 
the Uganda Development Corporation, and the up-grading of 
local cattle by cross-breeding with exotic cattle. 
The emphasis in the Plan is, however, placed on achieving self-
sufficiency rather than increasing exports. This is understandable 
in Uganda's conditions since she is still a major importer of animal 
products from Kenya, so that in the initial stages import substitu-
tion rather than export promotion seems unavoidable. In fact, it 
* Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations: East African 
Livestock Survey Vols I, II, III, Rome, 1967. 
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will require a major effort on Uganda's part to be able to substitute 
for almost all her imports of animal products, mainly because of 
the present high level of imports in relation to her domestic market-
able surplus, and secondly, because the rate of increase of 
consumption is expected to rise as fast as incomes rise. In the 
case of dairy products, for example it is not anticipated that imports 
can be entirely eliminated until the late 1970's. 
It has already been pointed out that the Kenya Government 
does not expect her exports of animal products to rise significantly 
over the Plan period. This is partly due to the fact that production 
of these products is unlikely to rise fast enough in relation to internal 
consumption. There is likely to be a noticeable drop in production 
from the ex-European farms consequent upon occupation of the 
same farms by new African settlers who, at any rate initially, may 
not be able to run these farms with the same degree of efficiency 
as the former owners. 
The determination of the Kenya Government to maintain and 
expand the livestock industry is, however, not in doubt. One piece 
of evidence of this determination was the decision to establish a 
Range Management Division in the Ministry of Agriculture in 
order to promote the development of ranching land. A number of 
ranches are being set up in the semi-arid areas of Kenya either as 
private ranches or on a co-operative basis. Government also intends 
to participate with commercial firms to establish five ranches 
in unoccupied areas of the Coast Province hinterland. 
In addition a commission of enquiry has recently reported to 
the Government on changes necessary to improve the production 
and distribution of livestock products in the country. Among its 
major recommendations is the amalgamation of the Kenya Dairy 
Board with the Kenya Co-operative Creameries Ltd. to form the 
Kenya Dairy Commission. This could undoubtedly save on opera-
ting costs, but it is the recommendation concerning the eventual 
abolition of fresh milk quotas which looks more radical, and is 
likely to give a considerable boost to the industry. The assignment of 
quotas to fresh milk producers has often been attacked by economists 
working on Kenya's agricultural problems on the ground that it 
restricts production in favour of established farmers, and is partly 
responsible for the high price of dairy products from Kenya on 
the East African market.7 
In spite of these efforts, it will not be possible for Kenya to 
increase her exports of livestock products substantially because of 
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the expected high increase in domestic consumption. For instance, 
it was expected that between 1964 and 1970 domestic consumption 
of all livestock products would be likely to rise by 39.4 per cent 
whereas exports were likely to rise by 21.2 per cent: in value terms 
the increases represent £3.9 million and £1.4 million respectively. 
It is expected that the range development programme will assist 
in this situation by increasing the off-take rate, and secondly by 
increasing the weight of animals slaughtered. 
In the Tanganyika Plan there is no emphasis being placed on 
increasing livestock numbers as such, but some efforts are to be 
expended on increasing animals' average weight by about 10 per cent, 
and stock off-take by another 10 per cent. Average liveweight of 
Tanganyika's livestock is said to be the lowest in Africa, while the 
average off-take is much below the desirable figure of 18 per cent 
annually. It is hoped that with these improvements it will be possible 
to increase the production of livestock products by about 5 per cent 
per annum. 
3 Tea* 
For the moment there does not seem to be a problem of world 
oversupply of this commodity, but by 1970 indications are that 
export prospects may begin to look grim. Compared to coffee 
prices, tea prices have held firm for the past few years, and it is 
this fact which is inducing many countries to expand their tea 
acreages or to replant old areas. 
On the demand side three things have to be taken into account 
when looking at the future of tea. First of all, there is the fact 
that in the developed countries income and price-elasticities for 
tea are very low. This means that increased consumption in these 
countries in the future will be dependent largely on increases in 
population rather than increases in incomes or reductions in prices. 
This situation would be better met by exporting to these countries 
teas of the highest quality, and also in forms more convenient to 
the consumer: tea bags and instant teas are recommended in this 
connection. Increased consumption in these countries could also be 
affected by publicity campaigns aimed at altering the tastes of the 
consumers; such campaigns have in the past been organised by 
* This section was written before the impact of U.K.'s sterling devaluation 
in November, 1967 on the value of East African tea earnings in terms of East 
African Currencies. 
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individual countries, but recently concerted action has been launched 
under the direction of a Tea Campaign Committee to which the 
major exporting countries and large importing firms in the United 
Kingdom have agreed to contribute funds. 
The second factor to be considered on the demand side is that 
consumption in the developing countries is highly responsive 
to price and income changes. At the same time the level of per 
capita consumption of tea is still very low. This means that in these 
countries rising incomes are likely to favour the consumption 
of tea. It also means that there is a possibility of exporting to these 
countries plain teas at lower prices. Tea is of course produced 
predominantly by developing countries—in the period 1959-61 
91 per cent of total world exports came from countries of this 
designation. But there is still a strong possibility of increasing 
exports to the non-producing developing countries of North Africa 
and Latin America. Increased per capita consumption in some of 
the producing countries themselves, especially India and Mainland 
China, would also ease the international trade problem of tea since 
these countries have large populations. 
Lastly, consumption of tea in centrally planned economies is 
at the moment very low indeed, and apparently there has not 
been any substantial increase in per capita consumption in these 
countries since the Second World War, although there has been a 
considerable rise in incomes over the last fifteen years. Per capita 
consumption in these countries is estimated at less than 4 per cent 
of that of the United Kingdom and about 10 per cent of such poor 
countries as the Sudan, Saudi Arabia, Ceylon and Malaysia. This 
low level of per capita consumption must be viewed against the 
background that tea drinking has for long been a well established 
tradition in East European countries, especially in the U.S.S.R. 
and Poland. There must therefore be room for increasing consump-
tion and sales in these areas. 
On the supply side expansion of tea production is likely to rise 
steadily. Many of the large producing countries, particularly 
India and Ceylon, have set high targets for tea production in their 
development plans. China (Taiwan), Ceylon and Pakistan have 
launched ambitious plans for increasing production by replanting 
schemes and fertilizer subsidies. The overall effects of these plans, 
however, are unlikely of themselves to result in an over-supply 
problem by 1970, and possibly not even by 1980: estimated consump-
tion by these two dates is likely to be roughly equal to estimated 
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production. This means that probably no overall increase in prices 
can be expected over this period. The unknown element in the tea 
trade will remain the production prospects of Mainland China. 
Already Mainland China has announced fairly ambitious plans 
for the production of tea which, if realised, could greatly upset 
the world tea market. 
These future trends will, in two respects, accord with the experience 
of the East African countries over the period covered by this study. 
In the first place, tea has not enjoyed rapid rises in prices: instead 
price increases overall have been rather moderate in magnitude, 
and in some periods minor price declines of less than 10 per cent 
have been registered for some countries. 
A second feature regarding tea exports over this period has been 
the sharp increase in the volume of exports: Kenya increased 
her volume of tea exports by over 300 per cent, Uganda by over 
400 per cent and Tanganyika by over 700 per cent, although the 
high percentage increases for Uganda, and particularly Tanganyika 
are accounted for mainly by the small volume of exports at the 
beginning of the period. These increased exports have been achieved 
without adversely affecting prices obtained because East Africa 
is still only a small exporter of tea compared to countries such 
as India and Ceylon. For instance, in 1962 East Africa's tea exports 
constituted only 4 per cent of the total world volume of exports. 
It can be expected, therefore, that for some time to come the volume 
of tea exports from the East African countries will not have signi-
ficant effects on the price obtained.* 
East African plans for tea production 
All the East African countries have very ambitious schemes for 
increasing tea production. Perhaps Tanganyika's 1964-69 Plan is 
the most ambitious in this regard, aiming as it does at more than 
doubling the 1962 output of 4,100 tons. The Plan aims at producing 
10,500 tons in 1970 and 20,600 tons in 1980. (It is in fact assumed 
in the Plan that there will be a rise in prices of about 4 per cent 
by 1970 compared to 1960-62). In the same way Kenya and Uganda 
have definite plans to give a substantial boost to the tea industry. 
One important theme which runs through all these plans, however, 
is the emphasis on small-scale producers in all three countries. 
* In early 1967 the East African countries managed to block efforts by the 
Asian producing countries to conclude an International Tea Agreement along 
the lines of the Coffee Agreement. There is a feeling in East Africa that there 
are untapped areas suitable for tea production, and that at even slightly lower 
prices than the current ones tea will still be a profitable crop to produce. 
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In the case of Tanganyika the idea of Africans growing tea is a very 
recent one: the World Bank Mission which visited Tanganyika in 
1959 noted that no tea was being grown by Africans at that time, 
although there was suitable land available in the Southern Highlands 
Province.8 The intention of the Government of Tanganyika as 
stated in the 1964-69 Plan, is therefore to increase African participa-
tion in this industry as soon as possible. It is intended that by 1970 
the share of small-scale producers—which should be taken to mean 
African producers—will have risen to 10 per cent and to 25 per cent 
by 1980.9 This will nevertheless mean fast expansion for the large 
estates also: they will be expected to more than double their output 
of 1962 by 1970 and their output in 1980 will be two-thirds greater 
than that of 1970. It must therefore be noted that a rapid expansion 
in estate production of tea is envisaged for Tanganyika. 
On the contrary the Kenya 1966-70 Plan concentrates on encourag-
ing production on small holdings to be administered by the Kenya 
Tea Development Authority. In 1962, 98 per cent of all tea produced 
came from large estates, and the value of the crop to the growers 
was estimated at about £6.7 million. By 1970 the value of the crop 
to growers will be nearly £11 million, but most likely the increased 
output will then accrue to smallholders. The intention of the Kenya 
Tea Development Authority is to increase the acreage owned by 
smallholders from about 10,658 acres in 1964 to 25,500 acres by 
1970.10 The Commonwealth Development Corporation is co-
operating in the scheme by providing at least half the finance 
required to build sixteen factories which are estimated to cost 
£2.2 million. This emphasis on small scale producers should not 
be interpreted as a deliberate policy of discouraging large-scale 
farmers from contributing to the economic development of the 
country. Estate-planted tea was already showing a sharp decline 
by 1961 when the new acreage planted fell to 500 as against a normal 
yearly planting of 3,000 acres. Political uncertainty was at that 
time largely responsible for this fall and, after independence, 
implementation of the policy of settling Africans on land formerly 
owned by the European farmers has hardly been conducive to 
further planting of tea by the major planting companies on a large 
scale. 
In addition Kenya is already a big producer of tea by East African 
standards as she produced 62 per cent of the region's tea in 1963. 
This means that she is in a better position than her neighbours to 
pay attention to who grows additional tea and to implement her 
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policy of African Socialism, whereas the problem in the other two 
countries, especially Tanganyika, is to get the industry going. 
Tanganyika's total production in 1963 was 4,939 tons, which consti-
tuted only 17 per cent of East Africa's production for that year. 
In Uganda great efforts are being expended in the development 
of the tea industry. The Second Five-Year Plan 1966-71 calls for 
an expansion of tea production from the present level of 23 million 
lbs of made tea to 42 million by 1971. Within this period most of 
this increase will come from those estates already established, 
particularly those owned and run by Agricultural Enterprises Ltd., 
a subsidiary company of the Uganda Development Corporation. 
But, as in Kenya, the Government is committed to the promotion 
of African smallholders in the production of tea. It has created 
the Uganda Tea Growers Corporation (UTGC) through which 
the Government hopes to further the participation of Africans in 
this industry. It is intended to treble the acreage cultivated by 
Africans of this crop within the Plan period, and to build ten 
factories in the future to handle the processing of the crop. 
The great emphasis on tea production in Uganda must also be 
viewed against the need to diversify Uganda's agricultural exports, 
and also the difficulties facing her two major exports, namely cotton 
and coffee. But speed is in fact, most important; the Tea Survey 
team which reported to the Government in 1964 on the development 
of the tea industry in Uganda warned against complacency regarding 
the future of world tea markets, and expressed the view that there 
was a likelihood of the supply of tea outstripping demand in the 
not-too-distant future.11 
4 Coffee 
The coffee market has been characterised by wide fluctuations in 
prices since the 1920's. The very low response of supply in the 
short run to changing prices, and the relatively inelastic demand 
are the main factors underlying the cobweb-type behaviour of 
prices in the coffee market. The coffee crop matures in about four 
to five years if planted from seed, and usually planting takes place 
during periods of rising prices, with the result that, until the new 
crop is ready, high prices continue giving further incentives for 
farmers to expand their acreage and for new farmers to enter the 
industry. In addition, yields tend to rise gradually to a peak when 
the tree reaches the age of eleven to fourteen years and it then 
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remains in production for another eight to twenty-three years. 
As a result of the surge in supply as trees reach the period of maturity, 
prices may drop very low indeed; and, because demand is not 
particularly responsive to prices, depressed conditions in the market 
continue until abandonment again reduces the supply.* 
There are two features relating to world coffee production and 
which distinguish the post-war period from the pre-war period. 
The first is the spread of coffee production over many areas which 
before the war were not major producers of coffee. The most 
significant feature here has been the emergence of Africa as a main 
producer of coffee in competition with the Latin American countries. 
Table IV: 1 shows that whereas in the thirties the Latin American 
countries accounted for something like 90 per cent of total world 
production of coffee, their share in 1962/3 was about 70 per cent and 
had been declining continuously over the years. This is also reflected 
in export figures which show that the share of the Latin American 
countries in the export trade has been falling almost at the same 
rate as their share in total production. In particular, the share of 
Brazil in total exports has fallen from about 60 per cent in the early 
thirties to just under 40 per cent in recent years. This increase in 
coffee production in Africa has, in part, been fostered by European 
countries which had colonies in Africa protecting the metro-
politan market against Latin American coffee exports. This was 
coupled with the success of restriction schemes by means of which 
the Latin American countries, and Brazil in particular, have sought 
to maintain high prices. Moreover, to the extent that they succeeded 
in maintaining prices remunerative to new-comers, African produc-
tion expanded to take advantage of this price 'umbrella'. 
This trend has now complicated the problem of agreeing on some 
form of restriction scheme without hard, bargaining: the irony 
of fate has operated in such a way that because of the very success 
of her valorization schemes in the thirties Brazil will never again, 
in the foreseeable future, be able to institute the same schemes 
independently. It also happens that the new producers are not 
only relatively poor compared to the majority of Latin American 
* Sincc the elasticity of a demand curve is not the same at all its points it 
seems a little unjustified to refer to an inelastic demand curve without specifying 
the range of prices one is thinking about. It is true, for instance, that some parts 
of a demand curve may be elastic within certain price ranges but inelastic in 
other sections. This point will again be referred to below when dealing with 
East Africa's plans for this crop. 
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producers, but there is some ground for believing that their produc-
tion costs are substantially lower than those of their competitors.* 
This creates a divergence of interest among coffee producers, with 
the low-cost producers having less interest in maintaining high 
prices if this would involve accumulation of stocks. 
At the moment there is an excess supply problem in the world 
coffee market which the 1962 International Coffee Agreement 
set out to solve: one of the aims of the five-year agreement was 
stated as "the adjustment of production to demand within the life-
time of the Agreement"—that is up to 1967. As a matter of fact 
it is now (1967) anticipated that this excess-supply situation is 
likely to be with us up to 1970, and even beyond. While, no doubt, 
the Agreement has failed to redress the balance between production 
and demand, it can at least be claimed that its existence has helped 
to maintain high prices within the traditional markets—although 
the effective price received must be calculated taking into account 
the very low prices received in non-quota markets and the surpluses 
producers may fail to dispose of at any price. 
Arguments relating to the desirability or otherwise of operating 
an agreement of the existing type will not be discussed in this study: 
the main concern here is to speculate on the course of future prices. 
By 1967/8 certain countries had threatened to leave the Agreement 
unless their quotas could be increased; a number of irregularities 
had been unearthed as when coffee originally sold to non-quota 
countries at extremely low prices has found its way into quota 
markets. Restricted quotas have particularly hit those countries 
whose coffee output was small prior to the 1962/3 negotiation of 
the Agreement, as this was the basis on which quotas were fixed. 
This did not take into account the large number of coffee trees 
planted after 1958 in certain countries such as Kenya. There is 
also the consideration that some countries can withstand the 
effects of lower prices better than others in which alternative 
opportunities are severely limited. 
Above all, there is the fact that the maintenance of fairly high 
prices still makes it profitable for some countries not only to expand 
their production but also for new ones to enter the industry. The 
*It has been suggested that the new coffee growing areas of Brazil may not 
be as high-cost as the old areas, but in terms of withstanding periods of low 
prices it is still possible that the small-scale producers in Africa would have an 
advantage. See also I. R. Wallace: The World Coffee Situation-, — and Peasant 
Producers in East Africa, Rural Development Research Papers, Makerere, 1966 
Table I V . I 
T R E N D S I N C O F F E E E X P O R T S , 1922-40 A N D 1948-60, A N N U A L A V E R A G E S 
( F I G U R E S I N B R A C K E T S I N D I C A T E P E R C E N T A G E S O F T O T A L E X P O R T S ) 
(Thousand Metric Tons) 
Period 
LAT IN AMERICA 
Total AFRICA 
REST OF 
THE WORLD Total 
Brazil Colombia Others 
1922—26 
1927—31 
1932—36 
1937—40 
1948—51 
1952—54 
1955—57 
1958—60 
823 (63.1) 
917 (60.8) 
853 (55.0) 
866 (53.5) 
1,021 (53.3) 
847 (44.2) 
896 (41.5) 
943 (39.0) 
125 ( 9.6) 
169 (11.2) 
208 (13.4) 
250 (15.5) 
304 (15.9) 
348 (18.2) 
315 (14.6) 
356 (14.7) 
245 (18.8) 
267 (17.7) 
279 (18.0) 
277 (17.1) 
288 (15.1) 
349 (18.2) 
400 (18.5) 
468 (19.4) 
1,193 (91.4) 
1,353 (89.8) 
1,340 (86.5) 
1,393 (86.1) 
1,613 (84.3) 
1,544 (80.6) 
1,611 (74.7) 
1,767 (73.1) 
27 ( 2.1) 
51 ( 3.4) 
104 ( 6.7) 
144 ( 8.9) 
275 (14.4) 
325 (17.0) 
483 (22.4) 
593 (24.5) 
85 (6.5) 
103 (6.8) 
106 (6.8) 
81 (5.0) 
25 (1.3) 
46 (2.4) 
63 (2.9) 
58 (2.4) 
1,305 (100) 
1,507 (100) 
1,550 (100) 
1,618 (100) 
1,913 (100) 
1,915 (100) 
2,157 (100) 
2,418 (100) 
P E R C E N T A G E S 
1922-26 to 1927-31 . . + 1 2 + 3 5 + 9 + 13 + 89 + 21 + 1 5 
1927-31 to 1937-40 . . - 6 + 4 8 + 4 + 3 + 182 - 21 + 7 
1937-40 to 1948-51 . . + 1 8 + 2 2 + 4 + 16 + 91 - 69 + 19 
1948-51 to 1955-57 . . - 1 2 + 4 + 3 9 0 + 76 + 152 + 1 3 
1955-57 to 1958-60 . . + 5 + 1 3 + 17 + 1 0 + 23 - 8 + 12 
Source: Food and Agriculture Organization, Commodity Bulletin 33, The World Coffee Economy, 
p. 17, Table 14. 
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quotation below hardly indicates that coffee production is being 
successfully discouraged: "Kenya and the Ivory Coast are attempting 
to prevent further planting of coffee; Togo and Burundi, however, 
propose to develop their small industries, while Guinea expects 
to expand its production more than fivefold under the seven year 
plan. Cuba plans to treble its output by 1970, while a new coffee 
institute proposes to develop the industry in Bolivia; more important 
is the proposed doubling of the output of coffee in Costa Rica 
over the next seven years and the scheme to develop the industry 
in Peru. It may be noted, too, that the fourth five-year plan in 
India contemplates the expansion of coffee production to 85,000 
tons per annum by 1970/71, although output in 1965/6 fell one-
eighth short of the third plan target of 80,000 tons."12 This is the 
most recent published assessment of the coffee production situation 
by the Food and Agriculture Organization, and for people who 
would like to see a reduction in coffee production it sounds rather 
dismal. In fact, it suggests that the coffee surplus problem will 
never be solved as long as present prices are maintained.13 
On the other hand, the consuming countries who are signatories 
to the Agreement will not continue to pay indefinitely high prices 
for coffee in the face of accumulating stocks.* This pressure 
will tend to reinforce that coming from low-cost producing countries 
and from those whose coffee is of such high quality that they are 
in a better competitive position. These forces are likely to result 
in a lowering of prices to the producers within the framework of 
the Agreement through the gradual expansion of quotas. 
Two further statements made in the 1966 Commodity review 
are instructive. It is stated that the level of export earnings from 
coffee were not maintained in 1965, and further there was a fall in 
consumption which the FAO attributes to high prices. The value 
of world coffee exports fell from $2,312 million in 1964 to $2,120 
million in 1965. 
The Review also points out that " . . . with new and higher 
yielding areas still coming into bearing, the immediate prospects 
are of world production expanding faster than consumption." 
In view of all this, it would seem reasonable to conclude that 
* It has been suggested that the International Coffee Agreement should be 
looked upon as somekind of aid scheme whereby the rich countries (the tradi-
tional consumers of coffee) subsidise the poor (the coffee producers). This 
overlooks the fact that the need for foreign aid and the ability to utilise it 
effectively are unrelated to whether a country is a coffee producer or not, and 
whether it is a small one or a large one, 
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coffee prices are likely to decline further in the near future even 
with the renewal of the Agreement. Prices would tend to fall more 
abruptly had the agreement to restrict exports not been renewed, 
but then the solution to the coffee problem would also have come 
quicker, namely the weeding out of high-cost producers. There 
would also have been some stimulation of consumption because 
of falling prices particularly in low income countries. It is needless 
to point out that the intervening period would have been a period 
of real hardship to many coffee producing countries which would 
not be able to adjust quickly to these new circumstances and which 
depend on coffee exports as a major source of income, capital, and 
government revenue. 
The historical study in Chapter 3 had indicated that the peak 
year for coffee prices was between 1954 and 1956. After this period 
prices began declining, although the most severe decline started 
after 1958. This trend continued up to 1962, and would have con-
tinued even further until enough producers had been discouraged 
but for the successful conclusion of the International Coffee 
Agreement in that year. With current production discouraged, it 
would not have been long before stocks began to decline, and then 
prices would have risen again. It is true, for instance, that it was 
the liquidation of Brazil's stocks in the early post-war years which 
accounted largely for the rise in prices in the early fifties, although 
increased consumption in the United States also played a part. 
East Africa's plans for coffee production 
The approach to coffee production in East Africa is conditioned 
mainly by the existence of the International Coffee Agreement 
which obliges these countries to limit their exports and to discourage 
further planting of coffee. Tn addition Kenya's approach is influenced 
by the feeling that there are still sizeable areas in Kenya suitable 
for coffee production which would have been planted with coffee a 
long time ago had there been a policy of encouraging Africans 
to plant the crop. It is also claimed that the quality of her coffee 
is very high. 
Tanganyika expects by 1970 to have nearly doubled her 1960-62 
average production of 27,000 tons, and to increase it by a further 
19,000 tons by 1980. This increased production is expected to 
come mainly from increased yield per acre rather than by increasing 
the total acreage whose expansion is expected to be slight. Great 
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attention will, at the same time, be paid to the improvement of 
the quality of the crop, as this would not only increase proceeds 
out of a given quota, but would also increase the competitiveness 
of Tanganyika's coffee in non-quota markets. Copper spraying 
of coffee trees and better processing of the crop in central pulperies 
are the major means by which quality improvements are to be 
achieved. If the Tanganyika coffee industry can withstand a period 
of low prices, this would seem a wise policy to adopt in view of 
the fact that high prices are likely to come some time after the 
1970's. 
Kenya was undoubtedly caught on the wrong foot when the 
Agreement was being negotiated. Her production was very low 
at the time quotas were being fixed: for instance in the crop year 
1960/61 her total coffee crop was around 33,000 tons which was 
less than her quota. But Kenya's 1966-70 Plan estimates that 
production from existing trees will result in a crop of about 70,000 
tons by 1970. On becoming a full member of the Agreement in 
1966, Kenya put up very strong representation to the International 
Coffee Council, especially with respect to her observance of the 
provisions of the Agreement by restricting further planting of 
coffee before she became a full member.* As a result she obtained 
very favourable treatment at the hands of the Council, and was 
allotted a quota which is sufficient to take care of her present level 
of output without accumulating stocks.** 
Only limited coffee acreages are to be planted in the next few 
years in certain districts which lacked the resources to participate 
in the massive planting programmes in the early sixties. 
The industry is at present beset by two major problems. The 
first is Coffee Berry Disease, a fungus which attacks the berries 
and can lead to losses of up to 30 per cent of the crop. No really 
successful treatment has been found to cure this disease apart 
from cutting down the infected trees. Secondly, the spread of coffee 
production to new areas has made it more difficult to maintain the 
quality of the crop for which Kenya's coffee is famous. This will 
* Kenya became a full member in 1966. At the time of negotiating the 
Agreement in 1962 she was not yet independent, but Great Britain signed on 
her behalf. 
** Kenya was temporarily given an initial quota of 516,835 bags and a 
waiver of 227,407 bags (a total of some 44,000 tons). Her quota will finally be 
fixed after a mission from the Coffee Council has visited the country. 
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become more important still in the future when market opportunities 
shrink even further as a result of increased competition. 
The situation in Uganda is complicated by two factors. First, 
coffee has, of late, acquired such prominence in the economy 
of the country that a reduction in its export would result in a signi-
ficant fall in the incomes of many farmers who would still find 
coffee a remunerative crop to grow even at lower prices. This reduc-
tion in incomes will have repercussions on both local and central 
government revenues, as well as on the general level of income, 
thus slowing down the pace of development considerably. 
In the second place, the bulk of the crop is grown by nearly 
half a million small farmers whose activities it will not be easy to 
control and co-ordinate, especially as no licence is required to plant 
the crop—not that this would make very much difference in the 
conditions prevailing. There are also some political problems 
which would make it very difficult to achieve a reduction in acreage 
by lowering the price to the grower sufficiently to make his shift 
into some other form of production inevitable. Coffee production 
is concentrated in the Buganda region in which the ruling party 
is trying to establish its influence against very heavy odds. There 
is also an export tax on coffee amounting to one-third of the value 
by which the price exceeds £90 per ton f.o.b. Mombasa for robusta 
and £195 per ton for arabica coffee. It will become increasingly 
difficult to justify the payment of low prices to the farmers while 
continuing to tax them at this rate. 
There are no plans in Uganda to increase the overall acreages 
under coffee. However, the 1966-71 Plan indicates that there will 
be an attempt to replace up to 10,000 acres of robusta coffee planted 
with arabica in the Western Region. It is also planned to increase 
the yield per acre of arabica coffee in Bugisu and Sebei by chemical 
spraying. It is planned to treble the yield per acre in the area by 
these disease control measures. 
More emphasis is to be placed on improving the quality of coffee; 
in particular robusta coffee farmers will now be encouraged to 
wet-process their crop, and a loan fund for this purpose amounting 
to £240,000 is being earmarked by the Government over the Plan 
period. 
For obvious reasons it would appear that the coffee industry 
is likely to stagnate in this country, especially if the Government's 
programme of introducing other high-value crops materialises. 
Output, on the other hand, is likely to rise because of the heavy 
Future price trends and development plans in East Africa 73 
planting which preceded the signing of the International Coffee 
Agreement; and in those areas where coffee is interplanted with 
banana trees, it is almost certain that coffee trees will continue to 
be looked after even if world prices were to fall further. 
5 Cotton 
The cotton crop is different from all the other crops considered 
so far mainly because the commitment to produce it is undertaken 
annually: the crop takes about six months to mature and the plants 
are uprooted after harvest. This would tend to make the supply 
of the crop more responsive to changing prices as between one 
year and another than is the case with coffee and tea. 
Another point of interest here is that the crop is produced by 
both developed and developing countries, with production roughly 
equally divided between developed countries, developing countries 
and centrally planned economies. This greatly affects trading 
relations between the developed and developing countries when 
it becomes necessary for the former group of countries to protect 
their own farmers, and also when cotton enters international 
trade in the form of aid. This problem arises only with respect 
to the United States since it produces about 90 per cent of all the 
cotton produced in the developed countries, and is the world's 
largest producer of cotton, producing nearly one-quarter of the 
total supply of the crop. 
At the same time the United States has, since the'fifties, accumulat-
ed stocks of this commodity which reached a peak in 1956 when 
they stood at nearly three million metric tons against world total 
production of about nine million metric tons. The main reason for 
the existence of such large stocks is that the United States Govern-
ment has been subsidising the American cotton farmer by guarantee-
ing to him a price much higher than the export price and being 
prepared to stock the surplus crop. In 1962 cotton stocks of more 
than million metric tons were still held in the United States, 
more than half of these being owned by the Commodity Credit Cor-
poration, a government body through which the Government buys 
up cotton surpluses from farmers. The world cotton price is, 
accordingly, very much affected by the policy of the American 
Government with respect to the disposal of these stocks. 
Another way through which the American Government influences 
the world cotton market is the sale of cotton on concessional 
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terms under the provisions of Public Law 480. This is really part 
of the aid programme whereby countries in difficulties can obtain 
agricultural commodities from the United States, the domestic 
proceeds from the sale of which are then advanced to the recipient 
country in the form of a long-term loan for use on development 
projects. India has been the major beneficiary under this programme 
with respect to famine relief, but she also received cotton on similar 
terms in the crop year 1963/4 when, as a result, Uganda had to 
make ad hoc arrangements to sell her cotton to Mainland China 
in large quantities because her major customer was being treated 
to cheap supplies from elsewhere. These two considerations make 
the policy of the United States Government a key factor in determin-
ing conditions in the world cotton market, and in fact the level 
of stocks held by that country and the method of their disposal 
are the major factors governing the short-run price of cotton on 
the world market. 
On the demand side there is at present a great deal of competition 
from man-made fibres. The vulnerability of cotton in this regard 
arises mainly from two factors. First of all, man-made fibres have 
got texture qualities which are very much desired by the consumer 
but are absent from the natural product. This puts cotton at a 
serious disadvantage since, from this standpoint, it is regarded as 
an inferior commodity to the artificial product, and can therefore 
be disposed of only at extremely low prices. Secondly, there is a 
strong likelihood that efficiency will increase much faster in the 
synthetic manufacturing industries, with the result that man-made 
fibres will become even more competitive with cotton. At the moment 
most synthetic materials are a little too high-priced compared 
to cotton fabrics, but technological improvements are more likely 
to be on the side of man-made fibres than on the side of raw cotton. 
Western Europe imports about 60 per cent of all cotton traded 
internationally, but their import demand is to a large extent tied 
to exports of cotton goods. As the developing countries set up 
their own textile industries, and as competition from Japanese 
textile mills intensifies, the demand from Western Europe for cotton 
is likely to remain stagnant and perhaps fall in absolute terms. 
The probability at the moment is that cotton prices are likely to 
remain weak on the world market, and subject to policy decisions 
of the United States Government, they are more likely to fall than 
rise. It will therefore become more difficult for cotton producing 
countries to expect to increase their export earnings from cotton 
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as competition among exporting countries becomes more intense. 
The tables presented in the appendix show that cotton prices 
have not been buoyant over the last few years for the East African 
countries, and their upward trend after the break-out of the Korean 
War was extremely short-lived compared to that of coffee. They 
dropped very rapidly after 1953 and they have never really recovered 
much beyond their 1950 level. 
East Africa's plans for cotton production 
Uganda is the largest cotton producer of the three East African 
countries, and her economy is very much dependent on the export 
of this commodity. In terms of export value it is second only to 
coffee. The 1966-71 Uganda Plan clearly states that if the Plan 
is to succeed there has to be a very large increase in the production 
of cotton. Accordingly, cotton production is to be increased by 
one-third by 1970/71 when total output will be about 575,000 bales. 
It will be a major task to achieve this target in Uganda's conditions. 
The main strategy for achieving this target is to continue the subsidy 
scheme on D.D.T. for spraying the cotton crop: it is claimed that 
a correct application of this insecticide could double the yield per 
acre. There will also be some emphasis on the use of fertilizers 
which, it is claimed, could increase yields by over 200 lbs. per acre. 
It must be pointed out that cotton is not a particularly profitable 
crop to grow in Uganda, and in most areas of Uganda it is regarded 
as a poor man's crop. The fact that cotton prices are likely to fall 
in the near future combined with the exhaustion of the Cotton 
Price Assistance Fund means that farmers are not likely to be 
offered higher prices for this commodity. There is an export tax 
on cotton which, if removed, could enable a high price to be paid 
to the fanners; however, the budgetary situation in the country 
makes this possibility remote. 
On the other hand if the cost of production could be reduced by 
increasing the yield per acre through the introduction of high-
yielding varieties, or the application of subsidised inputs, there is 
a chance that this target could be approached. There will still 
remain the problem of disposing of the crop in overseas markets 
which, in view of the above forecasts, will not be an easy job.* 
* Barter deals made with Uganda's largest cotton buyer, namely India, 
for the disposal of a large consignment of cotton from the 1965/6 crop are 
already running into trouble. 
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In the Kenya 1966-70 Plan the most ambitious scheme in the 
agricultural sector concerns cotton production. The intention of 
the Plan is to quadruple the cotton output of 1964/5 (23,000 bales) by 
1970/1. It is hoped to achieve this target by increasing the cotton 
acreage by 200 per cent by 1970, and also by increasing the yield 
from existing acreage by 50 per cent. Kenya is at present a minor 
producer of cotton accounting for only 10 per cent of East Africa's 
total output, and so there may be large areas in the country suitable 
for cotton production which have not yet been tapped. On the market-
ing side, however, there will be difficulties of selling the crop; the 
rapid expansion of production is likely to tax the marketing 
organisation of the Cotton Lint and Seed Marketing Board at a time 
when market opportunities are contracting. 
Tanganyika expects a secular fall in cotton prices; she nevertheless 
plans on more than doubling her 1960-62 average output by 1970, 
and output in 1980 is planned to be nearly six times as much. 
There is hope expressed in the 1964-9 Plan that the farmers will be 
able to maintain their competitive position in world markets by 
improving the efficiency of the cotton industry at home, especially 
by using fertilizers and insecticides. The expansion of cotton 
production will occupy a significant position on settlement schemes: 
the Plan in fact claims that cotton production is popular among 
rural producers. If this is true, it will prove a great asset in boosting 
production in the next few years. 
6 Sisal 
Sisal prices are dependent on three major factors: the prices 
of other hard fibres (both the natural and artificial ones) particularly 
abaca and henequen; the level of business activity especially in the 
agricultural and shipping industries; and, lastly, the supply of 
sisal proper, which in the short-run is pretty inelastic. Each of these 
factors will play a part in shaping the future prospects for trade 
in sisal. 
On the whole the outlook does not look bright, due to the develop-
ment of commodities which are close substitutes for sisal such as 
abaca, henequen and synthetic fibres. Among the natural hard 
fibres sisal is cheaper than abaca and, indeed, during periods of 
rising prices there is a tendency for the trade to substitute sisal for 
the lower grades of abaca. On the other hand, henequen is cheaper 
than sisal, and so during periods of rising prices, there may be a 
Future price trends and development plans in East Africa 77 
tendency to substitute this commodity for sisal In each case the 
reverse holds true when prices are falling, although there are limits 
to the possibility of substitution. But the important point here is 
that, given the demand for hard fibres, the supplies available of 
these other commodities greatly affects the willingness of the trade 
to pay high prices for sisal. 
The world's production of abaca is concentrated in the Far 
East, and the Philippines export nearly 90 per cent of total world 
exports. Existing plans in the Philippines are designed to double 
the present level of output by financing agricultural research and 
giving technical assistance to producers with the aim of replanting 
abandoned or neglected farms in the Davao area. Indonesia also 
has a very ambitious scheme of expanding her abaca production. 
The most likely outcome if these plans succeed, is that there will 
be a fall in abaca prices, since the demand for this commodity 
is unlikely to grow at this rate. This would lead businessmen to 
substitute abaca for sisal with the result that outlets for the latter 
are likely to be severely restricted by 1970. In Latin America output 
of henequen and sisal is likely to rise by 30-40 per cent between 
1960 and 1970, mainly as a result of improving the efficiency of the 
industry. 
At the moment competition from synthetic fibres is not an imme-
diate threat because of the high price of the artificial product: the 
synthetic commodity is said to cost about two-and-a-half times the 
cost of the natural product even taking into account the advantages 
of the former. It is, however, in the industrial and marine cordage 
business that synthetics are more likely to displace sisal products. 
It is claimed that the synthetic ropes do not rot as easily as the 
natural fibre ropes; it has also been found that the synthetic ropes 
run more smoothly round bales if they are used as baler twine. 
The entry of Brazil into the sisal industry in the mid-fifties has 
also adversely affected Tanganyika's dominance of the sisal market. 
The Government of Brazil has given full support to sisal producers 
and the industry was heavily subsidised right from the beginning. 
In 1956 and 1957 the Brazilian Government introduced a bonus 
of 48 cruzeiros per dollar accruing to sisal producers from their 
exports to the United States; this bonus was on top of the official 
rate of exchange of 18 cruzeiros to the dollar. In mid 1958 this 
system was generalised so as to include all sisal exports to other 
countries, and an inclusive rate of 92 cruzeiros per dollar was then 
paid to all sisal exporters.14 
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At the same time Mexico has greatly increased her exports of 
finished twines to the United States, which is the largest market 
for hard, fibres. In the 1950's a combination of these two factors 
reduced substantially East Africa's exports to the United States; 
for instance East Africa's exports of sisal to that country fell from 
71,900 tons in 1952 to a mere 16,400 tons in 1956. 
On the demand side, the main outlets for sisal are in agricultural 
twines, the demand for which varies with the level of agricultural 
activity in the developed countries. Although the level of agricultural 
activity may rise in the future and, notwithstanding what has been 
said above concerning the danger from synthetic fibres not being 
immediate, there is at present a great danger to the sisal industry 
due to the fact that reaper-binders are being replaced gradually 
by combine harvesters in developed countries. At the same time, 
it is likely that developing countries will side-step the reaper-binder 
stage and go directly to combine harvesters. This is bound to restrict 
the demand for sisal and other hard fibres, resulting in keen compe-
tition among the producers for customers. 
All these considerations put together indicate that prices for sisal 
are likely to decline in the near future. 
East Africa's plans for sisal production 
Tanganyika's sisal plans are not very ambitious. She is the world's 
largest producer of sisal, producing about 40 per cent of the world 
total output. Accordingly, changes in the volume of her exports 
could affect the price for this commodity on world markets. By 
1970 she intends to increase her production by a mere 35 per cent 
over her 1960/62 average output, and the 1980 projected output will 
be 30 per cent above that of 1970. There is also an expectation in 
the 1964/69 Plan that sisal prices are going to rise by 30 per cent by 
1970 (over 1960/62 average prices), and fall by 11 per cent between 
1970 and 1980. This should mean that the expansion in sisal produc-
tion after 1970 will be taking place against prospects of falling 
prices. As a matter of fact, prices in 1963 were 47 per cent above the 
1960/62 average prices so that an expectation of a rise of 30 per cent 
over the 1960/62 average must anticipate prices lower than those 
which were ruling in 1963 and 1964. This would be consistent 
with the Food and Agriculture Organization analysis of future 
price trends. 
On the whole, Tanganyika plans to meet the depressed conditions 
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in the sisal market by expanding her sisal exports to East Asia 
and Eastern Europe, and by pushing the sale of sisal by-products 
whose demand she expects to rise pretty fast, thus offsetting future 
changes in the traditional end-uses of the fibre. This will be additional 
to steps aimed at maintaining the quality of her sisal. 
Sisal production is also to figure in her settlement schemes 
as it is planned to set up five sisal estates at a total cost 
of £1.4 million for the first five years of their operation. These will 
actually be large settlements of about 5,000 acres each with a capacity 
to produce 2,000 tons of fibre per year. These will be additional 
to smallholder estates (to be set up adjacent to privately owned 
estates) which will be much smaller (500 acres each), and will 
draw upon the capital and technical know-how from the adjacent 
estates. At the time of writing, however, it appears unlikely that 
the Government intends to proceed with these settlements at this 
rate. 
Uganda has never taken to sisal production seriously: the quantity 
of sisal exported in 1963 was only one-third of what was exported 
in 1951. However, it is stated in the 1966-71 Plan that the Govern-
ment intends to reverse this trend by setting up a Sisal Board. 
It is hoped that the Sisal Board, in collaboration with private 
enterprise, will set up estates with individual smallholders who 
will be organised on a co-operative basis. In view of the price 
forecasts, the Board will have to operate extremely efficiently to 
be able to produce at a remunerative price, and to gain a foothold 
in a shrinking market. This will be a difficult job. 
The Kenya 1966-70 Plan recognises the difficulties which the 
sisal industry is going to face in the future; the picture which 
emerges is very similar to that presented in this study. Accordingly, 
the Government does not intend to invest any money in this industry, 
except perhaps in the field of research: "In general, Government 
policy is that there will be no public investment in any aspect of 
the sisal industry, apart from research, except on firm evidence 
that such investment will be profitable at sisal prices expected to 
prevail in the 1970's."15 This being the case, the Plan makes radical 
changes on the production side: the 1963 National Cash Crops 
Policy16 target of 20,000 tons annual production by smallholder 
producers is abandoned, and sisal planting on settlement schemes 
under the direction of the Department of Settlement is virtually 
dropped. It has, in some cases, been found necessary to uproot 
sisal on land purchased for settlement, 
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The Uganda and Tanganyika Governments perhaps have some-
thing to learn from the statement by the Kenya Government as 
to why they had to abandon their smallholder sisal schemes. 
They did so on the grounds that no means had yet been found of 
organising smallholder sisal production so as to cover costs at 
current price levels. Such a statement coming from a government 
with more experience of successful settlement schemes must be 
taken seriously. 
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2 
A STRATEGY FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF 
AGRICULTURAL EXPORTS 
It was pointed out in Chapter 2 that the great difficulties of 
increasing exports of manufactured products make it seem almost 
certain that the East African countries will, for a considerable time 
in the future, have to depend on exports originating from the 
agricultural sector. This is perhaps the most compelling reason 
why plans for the industrialisation of these countries must place 
great emphasis on agricultural exports in spite of the fact that this 
will, in the short run, conflict with the aim of reducing dependence 
on them. Hence the need to have a strategy for their development 
in the future. 
There are two objectives of planning policy which ought to deter-
mine strategy with regard to agricultural exports. First of all, 
there is the requirement that the level of total exports should rise 
fast enough to accommodate the external financial requirements 
of the East African plans. This requirement is set by the imports 
of capital equipment implied in the investment targets; the increased 
amounts of producers' intermediate goods and raw materials as 
industry grows, and the additional imported consumer goods arising 
out of increased disposable incomes when the benefits of develop-
ment are passed on to the consumer minus the import substitution 
which this development achieves. In the long-run exports must 
also cover payments of interest on foreign loans as well as repay-
ment of the loans themselves. In this regard it is worth noting that 
the high targets which have been set by the governments of East 
Africa in their plans will only be possible if the level of export 
earnings rises at the required rate. Foreign aid could somewhat 
relieve this constraint, but its timing and magnitude are hard to 
predict. 
Secondly, there is the need to have a steadily rising level of export 
earnings with fluctuations reduced to the minimum. It should be 
stressed that it is not only the downward movement in export 
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earnings that we are worried about, but also deviations from the 
average export earnings necessary for financing planned imports. 
These fluctuations can greatly disrupt planning strategy through 
losses of foreign exchange reserves and thus have repercussions 
on fulfilment of the Plan targets. This means that, apart from 
increasing the total value of exports fairly fast, there must be a 
policy of reducing fluctuations in export earnings. 
The means for achieving these aims will be discussed under two 
headings: these can conveniently be classed respectively as national 
measures and measures which call for international co-operation 
for their initiation and execution. The discussion of national 
policies will be restricted to what the East African countries can 
do on their own, and thus will exclude national policies of other 
countries which conceivably could affect the trade pattern of 
the East African countries. It should be emphasised that the distinc-
tion is not intended to imply that these are always alternative ways 
of achieving certain ends; in fact these measures ought to be looked 
at as complementary, and should be pursued simultaneously 
wherever they are not contradictory. For example, a successful 
international commodity agreement to reduce price fluctuations 
for a particular commodity should be used as an opportunity for 
diversifying the range of the agricultural exports of East Africa in 
line with her cost advantage; in such a case the agreement should 
be regarded as a short-run measure to enable the East African 
countries to adjust to long-term trends of demand and supply. 
The most sound economic argument in this respect is that an 
international commodity agreement should be used to prevent 
short-lived price changes which do not have a useful role for the 
purposes of resource allocation being passed on to producing 
countries, especially as these fluctuations may significantly affect the 
implementation of plans as a result of balance of payments crises. 
Foreign exchange proceeds from the sale of agricultural exports 
are dependent on the volume of exports on the one hand and the 
level of world commodity prices on the other. The importance 
of making this obvious distinction is that the volume of exports 
is a variable over which individual countries have some control 
(subject, of course, to the vagaries of nature) whereas they have 
very little or, more generally, no control over the prices they receive 
for their exports as they are, for the most part "price takers". 
On the other hand the effects of world price movements on the 
export earnings of an individual country would, to a large extent. 
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depend on the range and diversity of the commodities exported 
by that country. This affords a very good connection between 
measures designed to increase the volume of agricultural exports 
and those intended for diversifying them. The fact that the volume 
of agricultural exports has to be expanded means that diversification 
of exports can be undertaken without reducing the export of existing 
commodities, but by merely producing new types of export com-
modities. It is conceivable that in some cases it would be in the 
short-run national interest to expand the production of existing 
commodities in line with their present profitability to producers.* 
Looking at the problem in this way gives the concept of diversifica-
tion a different complexion; diversification is then accomplished 
not necessarily by reducing the production of existing commodities, 
but by adding new ones with emphasis perhaps shifting from 
one crop to another in the light of changing present knowledge 
about the future. 
An increased volume of agricultural exports can be achieved 
if either, other things being equal, more resources are employed 
in the production of these exports, or existing resources are utilised 
more fully. In practice, both measures have to be employed simult-
aneously although, in the short run, the former measure may be 
the easier to follow. Among the different means for pursuing these 
measures are such things as reform of the marketing system and 
land tenure; the adoption of better techniques of production; 
and the provision of economic incentives to the farmers to produce 
more. This is a very broad field about which a study of this sort 
cannot say very much, but looking at the East African scene, it is 
possible to specify policies which have got these objectives, such 
as group farming schemes, settlement plans and the encouragement 
of co-operative marketing. 
A policy oriented towards changing the composition of agricul-
tural exports and involving diversification of the export sector, 
ought, ideally, to be based on some estimate of returns to the farmer 
from different enterprises, projected into the future. It is important 
in this respect to emphasize that it is really future returns in which 
we are primarily interested since in agriculture most commodities 
have a long period of gestation, so that it is not satisfactory to base 
* It must be emphasized that diversification as an objective can only be 
achieved at a price: the price of failing to exploit short-run profitable oppor-
tunities. Opinions can of course differ on the magnitude of the price to be paid 
in order to achieve certain degrees of diversification. 
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production plans on present returns alone. This would entail 
projecting, and in some cases, forecasting costs and prices of various 
commodities some way into the future, and drawing up production 
targets accordingly. For obvious reasons, such an exercise must 
start with a thorough knowledge of the present profitability of the 
various major enterprises; but since part of the policy objective 
must be to diversify exports, this exercise must encompass com-
modities which perhaps have never been grown before on a com-
mercial scale in the country. This kind of exercise must also take 
into consideration the technical data relating to the production 
of these commodities so that, in fact, the amount of work involved 
can be quite formidable. For example, Chapter 4 of this study 
was confined to an examination of future price trends of a few 
commodities as a way of suggesting the sort of work which may 
have to be embarked upon, or intensified, in this field in East Africa. 
More information relating to costs of production, social attitudes 
to the production of different crops, technical information concern-
ing physical requirements for various crops etc. would have to be 
obtained before this information can be translated into extension 
advice to farmers. 
The magnitude of the task involved should not, however, deflect 
our attention from the need to diversify the agricultural exports 
of the East African countries, and for adjustment to long-term 
price trends. The danger facing Uganda of 'having all her eggs in 
one basket' (or strictly, in two baskets) has been discussed in 
Chapter 3 while admitting that in the short run it might have 
been more profitable not to diversify her exports. Adjustment to 
changes in market situations is necessary in order to ameliorate 
the effects of adverse terms of trade. The required changes may 
be between sectors or within individual sectors: the changes relevant 
to this study relate to the latter. 
International measures 
International measures will be discussed primarily with regard 
to the need to achieve greater stability in the export earnings of 
the East African countries, rather than as means for increasing the 
volume of agricultural exports from these countries. This is because, 
although it is known that the removal of obstacles to trade in 
agricultural commodities on an international scale would, to a 
certain extent, increase exports from developing countries, indications 
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are that this change would be of a once-and-for-all nature, and 
would not of itself ensure that the quantum of agricultural exports 
would go on rising. The demand for agricultural exports is unlikely 
to rise fast enough even after the removal of obstacles to trade; 
this, after all, has been the experience even within single countries 
where such obstacles do not exist. Accordingly, it is in the area 
of stabilizing prices and earnings from agricultural commodities 
that international action is likely to be more effective. 
There is a considerable amount of literature on the problems of 
stabilizing the prices and incomes received by primary producing 
countries, which it is not necessary to recount here.* Our main 
task is to try to indicate some of the international arrangements 
connected with stabilization which the East African countries 
could support, and what their approach should be towards them. 
Broadly speaking, these can be divided into two: there are arrange-
ments, such as the International Coffee Agreement whose aim is 
primarily to stabilize world prices, while there is another group of 
schemes designed to stabilize the export earnings of primary 
producers in the short run.** Examples of measures of the latter 
type will be given from the four leading proposals for compensatory 
financing for export fluctuations put forward by the United Nations, 
the International Monetary Fund, the Organisation of American 
States, and by the Government of Tunisia. 
international commodity agreements 
The basic economic justification for international commodity 
agreements is that where the demand for a commodity is inelastic 
the total revenue accruing to the producers of that commodity, 
as a group, would fall if they were to allow prices to fall. Accordingly, 
it is in the interests of the group that prices are not allowed to fall: 
this has always been recognized but lately the argument has become 
more compelling when the group of producers concerned is identified 
as being very much poorer than the consuming group, with the 
connotation that such a fall in revenue represents a transfer of 
income in the wrong direction to that deemed desirable. Moreover 
* For instance, a whole issue of Kyklos in 1959 was devoted entirely to this 
problem: Kyklos, 12 (1959). 
** It has always been argued, in this respect, that for individual countries 
stabilizing prices alone could de-stabilize their incomes because of changes 
in the volume of exports, and hence the need to focus attention on income 
stabilizing schemes as well as on those intended for stabilizing prices. 
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the producers, on their part, are engaged in the production of 
commodities whose supply, in the short run, is highly inelastic; 
and in addition they are so dispersed that, following independent poli-
cies which they believe to be in their own interests, in the end they 
spoil the game for everybody. It has, therefore, been argued that it 
is only by organising themselves on a global scale that they can 
safeguard their interests, and in fact some system of international 
commodity agreements has been strongly recommended by the 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development which 
took place in Geneva in 1964.1 
With this kind of reasoning, international commodity agreements 
designed to even out short-run fluctuations in prices command 
considerable sympathy among economists; the major trouble 
with such arrangements starts when short-run motives of price 
stabilization become confused with motives for increasing the 
incomes of primary producers by fixing prices which result in losing 
touch with the long-run equilibrium level of prices. The approach 
and attitude of the East African countries to such agreements 
ought to be guided by three major considerations. 
The first consideration is that they should pay attention to the 
profitability of the crop for which an agreement is to be negotiated 
as compared to other crops produced in East Africa, not only 
for export but also for domestic consumption. When a certain 
commodity can be produced in larger quantities, even when its 
price were to fall a restriction of its production would represent 
a misallocation of resources within that country. It happens, for 
instance, that although coffee prices have been falling sharply 
over the last few years coffee still remains a relatively attractive 
enterprise compared to the production of many commodities. 
In such a situation the restriction of coffee production in order to 
maintain high prices would force resources into less profitable 
channels. In this respect the firm stand taken by the East African 
Governments against an international tea agreement is a move in 
the right direction. 
Secondly, it is important for these countries to know, even if in 
rough terms, how their costs of production compare to the costs 
of producing the same commodity in other producing countries, 
especially the major producing countries. This is very difficult 
to estimate mainly because of the use of different currencies, and 
the difference in opportunity costs of the same resources in different 
countries. Nevertheless, it is a fact that some countries' costs of 
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producing the same commodity are much higher than others, 
in which case a low cost producing country should not be as eager 
about a restriction scheme as the high cost producers. 
These two considerations are extremely important, and their 
importance derives from the fact that short-run measures intended 
for evening out price fluctuations do have undesirable long-run 
effects in so far as they do not take into account the comparative 
advantage different countries have in the production of particular 
commodities, but instead base their quotas on some average level 
of production or exports over a previous period. This, in effect, 
means that industries which have developed under strong govern-
ment assistance and subsidies are ranked almost the same as those 
which are more efficient, for the purposes of allocating quotas.* 
It seems obvious that the East African countries should be interested 
in schemes designed to even out short-run fluctuations in prices, 
but they should be on the look-out for long-run effects resulting 
from these arrangements, and the above two factors can act as a 
guide to the viability of the industry in East Africa in the long run.** 
The aim should be that these countries should not be forced to 
diversify into uneconomic lines of production for the sake of short-
run considerations alone, and that a right balance should always 
be struck between these two competing objectives. 
The third factor to watch is the cross-elasticity of demand for 
the crops produced by these countries in relation to those of other 
countries. An example will make this point clear. Uganda robusta 
coffee commands very good prices because it makes good instant 
coffee, but it is also reported that Brazilian coffee could be used 
for instant coffee production, and that perhaps it would make a 
better product.2 At existing levels of prices, however, the instant 
coffee manufacturers cannot afford to use Brazilian coffee, but 
* I am now assuming that an international commodity agreement would 
have the attribute of restricting exports, and possibly production. This need not 
always be so, but the most important and effective ones do; the usual pattern 
being that supply restrictions increase total revenue (or prevent it from falling) 
for the producers as a group, and the allocation of export quotas determines 
the gains which accrue to each of the participants. This assumes that the demand 
curve, within the relevant price range, is inelastic. 
* * It is abundantly clear that in many cases the attitude of the East African 
countries, either individually or as a group, may not be the deciding factor as 
to whether an international agreement is eventually agreed upon, in which case 
they would face a lot of discrimination if they refused to co-operate. But for some 
commodities such as sisal, coffee and cotton their point of view would be 
respected. In any case, their attitude could differ from what they eventually 
agree upon. 
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there is a great possibility that if the general level of coffee prices 
fell the trade, rather than lowering instant coffee prices, would go 
in for the superior product, and this would adversely affect the 
sales of Uganda's coffee. And there are a number of other com-
modities to which this kind of phenomenon applies. It was, for 
instance, noted in Chapter 4 that sisal is in the same position 
with respect to abaca. All that this means is that these countries 
should never allow prices to fall to those levels where the demand 
curve for their products is highly inelastic—in other words where 
East Africa's commodities become "inferior" goods. 
On the other hand, a restriction scheme which raised prices too 
high might invite competition from new sources of supply which 
may prove extremely difficult to compete against once they are 
established. This has happened to Brazil with regard to coffee 
where in the 1950's she found herself in a position of having almost 
no control over market prices because of the success of her valoriza-
tion schemes in the thirties. New competition may also take the 
form of the production of man-made products whose production, 
in the first instance, is made economically possible because of high 
prices for the natural product, but which, once established, becomes 
more competitive due to the economies of large-scale production 
and the greater ability to introduce innovations in manufacturing 
industries. 
Proposals for compensatory financing3 
Various proposals have been made by different international 
bodies to establish systems of financial compensation for export 
fluctuations, and thus at least partly to stabilize export earnings 
for developing countries. Their main concern is to prevent abrupt 
shortfalls in export proceeds which are harmful to the success of 
development plans. While there are significant differences in their 
content, they have a common emphasis on short-run stabilization, 
and are not intended to do more than soften intermediate-term 
declines in a country's export proceeds. These can only be dealt 
with by structural changes within the country, or for a limited 
number of products by international commodity agreements. 
Four of these proposals are compared in this study. Table V:1 
provides a comparative summary of their main provisions with 
respect to defining an export shortfall, determining compensation, 
repayment conditions, financing and estimated costs. 
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The first proposal is that made by a Committee of Experts 
appointed by the United Nations Secretary-General in 1960 to 
examine "the feasibility of establishing machinery, within the 
framework of the United Nations, designed to assist in offsetting 
the effects of large fluctuations in commodity prices on balances 
of payments, with special reference to compensatory financing . . ."4 
In setting their standard, the UN experts considered that any 
shortfall in export earnings from a moving average of the previous 
three years should attract attention with a view to compensation. 
Their proposal was designed to have certain attributes of social 
insurance, notably a structure of premiums and benefits which 
would transfer resources from developed to underdeveloped coun-
tries. The fund was to be set up in the first instance by initial sub-
scriptions to provide working capital, and then kept going by 
annual premiums assessed on member countries as a percentage 
of the value of their exports. Alternatively, for developed countries 
only, per capita income might be taken into account in assessing 
contributions. 
Compensation would be paid out automatically to member 
countries to the value of 50 per cent of any export shortfall beyond 
a certain minimum deduction, which might be set between 2\ 
per cent and 10 per cent. In their Type 1 proposal, as with social 
insurance, such compensation would not be repaid. Annual pre-
miums in the order of 0.5 per cent of exports would probably be 
needed, with a minimum deduction of 5 per cent. If the UN Type 1 
proposal had been in effect from 1953 to 1959, it would have had 
an average annual cost of $468 million, of which developing countries 
would have contributed SI42 million and received S383 million. 
The proposal of the Organization of American States defines 
shortfalls in the same way but the methods of compensation and 
financing are different.5 Financing would be by initial contribution 
only, of which developed countries contribute two-thirds and 
waive benefits. Developing countries would be compensated to 
the extent of 67 per cent of any shortfall as defined above, without 
a minimum deduction. Instead of annual premiums, the fund would 
be kept going by repayments; thus 67 per cent of any surplus in 
future years must be applied to repayment of existing credits, 
and if any credits are outstanding for over three years, they must 
be paid off half in the fourth year and half in the fifth year regardless 
of the magnitude of shortfalls or surpluses. This proviso ensures 
that the fund will not run out of resources, and also demonstrates 
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that the function for which the fund was designed is short-run 
stabilization. It is also proposed that a low rate of interest should be 
charged on outstanding credits to defray administrative costs. 
If the OAS scheme had operated from 1952-60, it would have paid 
average annual benefits to developing countries approximately 
the same as in the UN proposal, but of course all would have been 
repayable. 
The International Monetary Fund takes exception to both the 
UN and OAS experts on the way they define a normal level of 
exports.0 On the basis of statistical calculations by their staff 
members, the IMF argues that a formula giving more weight to 
the current year (50 per cent) and combining it with the previous 
two years (25 per cent each) provides a more reliable estimate of a 
normal level of exports. In their view: "The fact that exports in 
any given year have been lower (or higher) than they were in preced-
ing years is very often an indication of a downward (or upward) 
trend which may well persist for some years to come." 
More fundamentally, the IMF argues that a new automatic 
compensation scheme is neither necessary nor desirable. They 
present data suggesting that present reserves and IMF quotas are 
adequate to cover the maximum export fluctuations of the last 
decade for all but a few countries. They also contend that inter-
national credit should be extended only after considering all aspects 
of a country's balance of payments situation. 
However, the IMF has at the same time announced a policy of 
greater readiness to extend credit to developing countries faced 
with export fluctuations—up to 25 per cent beyond the country's 
normal use of its IMF quota. Like all IMF credits, such loans 
would depend on the IMF being satisfied that the member country 
is itself trying to cover the deficit, and is in addition making 
reasonable attempts to avoid long-term declines in her export 
proceeds. 
The proposals described so far limit export proceeds to mer-
chandise items in the balance of payments. The proposal by the 
Tunisian Government, while retaining the idea of a moving-
average norm, urges that export proceeds should allow for net 
invisible items, such as transport and insurance services, tourism, 
foreign loan repayments, etc.7 They argue that the movement of 
some of these invisibles is sometimes such as to nullify surpluses 
on merchandise account. They also propose that the purchasing 
power of exports should be taken into account, although they do 
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not grapple with the difficult technical problem of determining 
changes in terms of trade. 
The greater complexity of the Tunisian approach is related to 
their view that considerable discretion should be exercised by the 
agency administering the system. Other factors besides trade figures 
should be taken into account in deciding on the amount of compensa-
tion. These they refer to as "adventitious", cyclical or structural 
factors characterising the shortfall country. After allowing for 
these factors, normally 75 per cent of the shortfall should be com-
pensated. Compensation should be in the form of a loan repayable 
in good years within the next three years. However, since a smal-
ler proportion of any future surpluses, e.g. 50 per cent, would be 
applied to loan repayment, and any credits outstanding for 
more than 3 years would be written off, the Tunisian proposal 
does imply a net drain on the fund. For the provisions indicated in 
Table V.l the Tunisian scheme would cost about three-fifths as 
much as the U N proposal. 
One final feature of the Tunisian proposal needs to be mentioned. 
This is the emphasis on the need for a high level of foreign exchange 
reserves for developing countries, in order to maintain confidence 
in their currency abroad and be able to attract foreign capital for 
development. This constraint would more or less rule out the 
possibility of running down reserves to meet unforeseen contingencies 
and call for even greater reliance on the compensation system. 
Effects of various proposals on Uganda, Tanganyika and Kenya 
Tables V.2 to V.5 show the effects of applying the U N and OAS 
proposals to the exports of the East African countries for the 
period 1952 to 1962. The results may be summarised as follows. 
Uganda 
Under the U N proposals Uganda would have paid contributions 
amounting to £2.3 million and would have drawn benefits of the 
order of £4.6 million over the 11-year period (see Table V.2). The 
ratio of benefits to contributions here works out at 2 to 1, which is 
attractive though still below the average of nearly 3 to 1 which 
the U N experts calculated for developing countries as a group 
from 1953 to 1959. More than half of the benefits would have been 
drawn in 1953 with smaller sums being received in 1960, 1961 
and 1962. 
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Under the OAS proposals Uganda would have received stabiliza-
tion credits in 1953 and 1954 of £6.4 million. During the next four 
years she would have paid them off. This would have had the effect 
of narrowing the range of variation in her export proceeds by 
about two-thirds over the period 1953 to 1958: £33.4 million to 
£45.9 million without compensation as compared to £38.5 million 
to £42.9 million with compensation. 
After 1959 Uganda's exports proceeds began to fall continuously 
to the end of the period mainly because of a downward trend in 
prices. This would have made Uganda more dependent on the fund, 
drawing credits to the tune of £7.3 million during the next four years. 
These credits would of course have to be repaid in succeeding years, 
which might be readily accomplished if exports recovered, but which 
would be very difficult if they stayed depressed. 
Tanganyika 
Tanganyika would have obtained compensation in 1953, '54 and 
'55 amounting in total to £2.3 million under the UN scheme but 
her contributions over the entire 11-year period would have been 
nearly £2.4 million (see Table Y.3). This result is obtained because, 
since 1955, Tanganyika has not had any shortfalls in her export 
proceeds, although there were fairly large fluctuations in the prices 
for her exports. Her rising volume of exports has offset short-run 
price declines. On the other hand since contributions are assessed 
on the basis of value of exports her contributions would have 
been virtually the same as for Uganda. 
Under the OAS scheme Tanganyika would have received credits 
for the same years, 1953, '54 and '55, totalling £6.2 million. She 
would have been able to pay off these credits entirely within the 
next two years—in fact £6.1 million in 1956 alone—because of a 
favourable upturn in her exports. Without such credits her exports 
would have ranged between £34.3 million and £44.8 million in the 
period 1953 to 1958, but with this scheme in operation the range 
would have been reduced to £36.0 from £39.0 million. 
Kenya 
Kenya would have participated least of all in either the U N 
or the OAS schemes, partly because of her smaller export value 
but mainly because of her comparatively stable and rising trend in 
export earnings (see Table V.4). Under the UN plan, she would have 
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received benefits in 1953 and 1954 amounting to £1.7 million, 
against premiums over the 11-year period of £1.6 million. Thus 
like Tanganyika she would have substantially broken even. 
Under the OAS scheme she would have received credits in 1953 
and 1954 amounting to £3.8 million, and been able to pay them oft' 
during the next two years. This would have approximately halved 
the range of her export proceeds variation; from £19.5—£29.0 
million without compensation to £21.4—£26.5 million with 
compensation. 
East Africa 
To sum up, Uganda would have been a net gainer under the UN 
proposal, though less than the average for all developing countries 
as a group, while Tanganyika and Kenya would have approximately 
broken even. All three countries would have enjoyed more stable 
export earnings under the OAS scheme than without it, Uganda 
drawing most heavily on the fund, then Tanganyika, and then 
Kenya. Because of their comparatively favourable export trends, 
the three East African countries have greater interest in the stabiliza-
tion aspect of an international compensation scheme than in net 
transfer of resources to lagging countries. 
It may also be noted that the amount of compensation accruing 
to the East African countries would be reduced if East Africa 
joined these schemes as one block, except in those years when all 
the countries have a shortfall (see Table V.5). This is because for 
the region as a whole surpluses in one country tend to offset short-
falls in another country thus rendering the whole region ineligible 
for compensation. Thus compensation would have been paid to 
East Africa under both schemes only in 1953 and 1954, and premiums 
would have exceeded benefits by about £0.6 million under the U N 
scheme. Of course for a stabilization plan like that of the OAS, 
reduced use of the international fund simply reflects the automatic 
stabilization resulting from the larger East African pool, but to 
enable each country to share in the same way in this automatic 
stabilization, compensatory loans within East Africa would also 
be needed. 
If this past experience is any guide to the future, the East African 
countries would have distinctly greater interest in measures tied 
to price changes for their key primary exports (which after all 
comprise a large percentage of their total exports) than in measures 
Table V.I 
C O M P A R I S O N O F F O U R SCHEMES FOR C O M P E N S A T O R Y F I N A N C I N G O F E X P O R T F L U C T U A T I O N S 
1. Definition of export 
shortfall. 
United Nations 
Exports3-
Merchandise exports 
more than 5 per cent 
below average of pre-
vious three years. 
Organization of 
American Statesb 
Merchandise exports 
below average of previous 
three years. 
International 
Monetary Fundc 
Merchandise exports 
below average of current 
weight 50 per cent and 
two previous years. 
Tunisiad 
Exports plus net invisible, 
adjusted for import 
prices, more than 5 per 
cent below average of 
previous three years, 
allowing for "adventi-
tious factors". 
2. Nature of 
compensation. 
Automatic payment of 
50 per cent of shortfall. 
Automatic loan of 67 per 
cent of shortfall. 
Discretionary loan norm-
ally up to 25 per cent of 
IMF quota, supplement-
ing regular IMF loans & 
reserves. 
Discretionary loan about 
75 per cent of shortfall, 
allowing for "adventi-
tious factors". 
3. Repayment 
conditions. 
4. Financing. 
Not repaid. 
Initial subscription 
plus annual premiums 
based on exports (or 
GDP for developed 
countries); developed 
countries contribute 
about 70 per cent and 
receive about 20 per cent. 
Repayment 67 per cent of 
excess over 3-year aver-
age, plus half of all credit 
outstanding over three 
years. 
Initial capital only; 
developed countries con-
tribute 67 per cent and 
waive benefits. 
Repayment according to 
regular IMF procedures. 
No special financing. 
Repayment 50 per cent 
of excess over 105 per 
cent of 3-year average; 
credits might be written 
off after three years. 
Initial subscription plus 
annual premiums based 
on unspecified combina-
tion of nat. income, 
export dependence, ex-
port instability. 
5. Calculated gross cost 
or benefitsz (mil. $) 
6. Net costs (mil, $) 
1953-59: 
$2684 UDC 
595 Dev. 
3279 Total 
(468 per yr.) 
(383 for UDC) 
Same as gross. 
1952-60: 
$3291 UDC 
— Dev. 
3291 Total 
(366 per yr). 
Initial capital $1800; 
maximum credit out-
standing 1952-60 $1441 
Not comparable. 1953-60: 
? UDC 
? Dev. 
4905 Total 
(614 per yr.) 
$2260 (282 per yr.) 
Notes: 
(a) U.N., International Compensation for Fluctuations in Commodity Trade, 1961. 
Provisions listed in the table are for Type I plans, with non-repayable settlement of claims. Loan plans were also considered, as 
well as variants, e.g. minimum percentage decline in exports, and other details not shown in the table. 
(ti) Organization of American States, Final Report of the Group of Experts on the Stabilization of Export Receipts, May 1962. 
(c) International Monetary Fund, Compensatory Financing of Export Fluctuations, Feb. 1963. Definition of export shortfall is 
used only in the calculation comparing needs and reserves, but it is argued that this formula is closer to an "ideal" norm, 
represented by a 5-year moving average centred on the current year, than UN and OAS formulas. The policy statement specifies 
only that IMF will establish reasonable estimates of the medium-term trend in exports, using statistical data and judgment 
about export prospects. 
(d) Government of Tunisia, Instability in Commodity Trade and Internationa! Machinery for Compensatory Financing, U N document 
E/Conf. 46/PC/4, April 1963. Provisions listed in the table are for Plan J, one of seventeen for which calculations are made, 
and among the lowest in net cost. 
(e) Countries included are not identical, but the differences are not believed to affect relative costs significantly. 
( / ) The distribution of the cost or benefits of the Tunisian proposals between developed and developing countries cannot 
be calculated because of the many unspecified criteria for assessment and compensation. 
T a b l e V.2 
U G A N D A : POSSIBLE BENEFITS FROM O A S A N D U N P R O P O S A L S 
Year 
1949 
1950 
1951 
1952 
1953 
1954 
1955 
1956 
1957 
1958 
1959 
1960 
19 61 
1962 
TOTAL: 
Export 
Value 
(£000) 
23,433 
28,669 
47,197 
47,223 
33,379 
40,575 
41,902 
40,418 
45,857 
45,409 
42,091 
41,588 
39,195 
37,635 
3-Year 
Moving 
Average 
33,100 
41,030 
42,600 
40,392 
38,619 
40,965 
42,726 
43,895 
44,452 
43,029 
40,958 
Deviation Deviation OAS 
(£000) % Compensa-
tiona (£000) 
Notes: 
UN UN 
Compensa- Contributionb 
/Zona (£'000) ' (£000) 
+ 14,123 + 4 3 
- 7,651 - 1 9 +5,100 +2,800 
- 2,025 - 5 + 1,350 
+ 1,510 + 4 - 1 , 0 0 6 
+ 1,799 + 5 - 1 , 2 0 0 
+ 4,892 + 12 - 3 , 2 6 2 
+ 2,683 + 6 - 982 
- 1,804 - 4 + 1,202 
- 2,864 - 6 + 1,910 +321 
- 3,834 - 9 +2,556 + 842 
- 3,323 - 8 + 1,615 +638 
7,283c 4,601 2,276 
a. See Table V.l for formula used. 
b. Based on 0.5 per cent of export value, as indicated in U N report, for scheme with 5 per cent deduction. 
c. Maximum cumulative credit received. 
T a b l e V.3 
T A N G A N Y I K A — P O S S I B L E BENEFITS FROM O A S A N D U N P R O P O S A L S 
Year 
Export 
Value 
(£000) 
3-Year 
Moving 
A verage 
Deviation 
(£000) 
Deviation 
% 
OAS 
Compensa-
tiona (£000) 
UN 
Compen 
tiona (£0 
1949 19,233 
1950 23,768 
1951 39,343 
1952 47,020 27,448 + 19,572 + 7 1 
1953 34,545 36,710 - 2,165 - 6 + 1,444 + 115 
1954 36,251 40,303 - 4,052 - 1 0 +2,702 + 1,019 
1955 36,188 39,272 - 3,084 - 8 +2,056 + 1,120 
1956 44,805 35,661 + 9,144 + 2 6 - 6 , 0 9 6 
1957 39,431 39,081 + 350 + 1 - 106 
1958 41,707 40,141 + 1,566 + 4 
1959 45,287 41,981 + 3,306 + 8 
1960 54,854 42,142 + 12,712 + 2 9 
1961 48,667 47,283 + 1,384 + 3 
1962 51,241 49,603 + 1,638 + 3 
UN 
Contributionb 
(£000) 
TOTAL 6,202c 2,254 2,399 
Notes: See Table V.2. 
Table V.4 
K E N Y A — P O S S I B L E BENEF ITS F R O M O A S A N D U N P R O P O S A L S 
Year 
1949 
1950 
1951 
1952 
1953 
1954 
1955 
1956 
1957 
1958 
1959 
1960 
1961 
1962 
TOTAL 
Export 
Value 
(£000) 
10,964 
17,182 
24,068 
25,792 
19,521 
20,260 
25,667 
28,983 
26,361 
29,300 
33,306 
35,191 
35,326 
37,913 
Notes: See Table V.2. 
3-Year 
Moving 
Average 
17,405 
22,347 
23,127 
21,858 
21,816 
24,970 
27,004 
28,215 
29,656 
32,599 
34,608 
Deviation 
(£000) 
+ 8,387 
2,826 
2,867 
3,809 
7,167 
1,391 
2,296 
5,091 
+ 5,535 
+ 2,727 
+ 3,305 
Deviation 
% 
+ 4 8 
- 1 3 
- 1 2 
+ 17 
+ 3 3 
+ 6 
+ 9 
+ 18 
+ 19 
+ 8 
+ 10 
OAS 
Compensa-
tion1 (£000) 
UN 
Compensa-
tion-1 (£000) 
UN 
Contributionb 
(£000) 
+ 1,884 
+ 1,912 
- 1 , 2 7 0 
- 2 , 5 2 6 
3,796 
+855 
+856 
1,711 1,588 
Table V.S 
EAST A F R I C A — P O S S I B L E BENEF ITS F R O M O A S A N D U N P R O P O S A L S 
Export 3- Year Deviation Deviation OAS UN 
Value Moving (£000) °/o Compensa- Compensa-
Year (£000) Average tion& (£000) tion» (£000) 
1949 53,630 
1950 69,619 
1951 . . 110,608 
1952 . . 120,035 77,952 +42,083 + 53.9 
1953 87,445 100,087 - 1 2 , 6 4 2 - 1 2 . 6 + 8,428 + 3,819 
1954 97,086 106,029 - 8,943 - 8 .4 + 5,962 + 1,821 
1955 . . 103,757 101,522 + 2,235 + 2 2 - 1,490 
1956 . . 114,206 96,096 + 18,110 + i i ! i - 1 2 , 0 7 4 
1957 . . 111,649 105,016 + 6,633 + 6 .3 - 826 
1958 . . 116,416 109,871 + 6,545 + 6 .0 
1959 . . 120,684 114,090 + 6,595 + 5 .8 
1960 . . 131,633 116,250 + 15,383 + 13.2 
1961 . . 123.1S8 122,911 + 277 + .2 
1962 . . 126,798 125,168 + 1,621 + 1 .2 
TOTAL 
UN 
Contributionb 
(£000) 
Notes See Table V.2. 
14,390° 5,640 6,263 
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tied to value of exports. If a system had been in operation which 
provided compensation whenever prices fell more than 5 per cent 
below a moving-average norm, Uganda would have received larger 
benefits or loans in 1959, 1960 and 1961 than under the UN and 
OAS schemes, while Tanganyika and Kenya would have become 
eligible for benefits or loans in 1957 and 1958. 
The UN mandate to the committee which investigated this 
problem implied that it was large fluctuations in commodity prices 
which were responsible for fluctuations in export earnings. Within 
the limitations of the vagaries of the weather and natural forces, 
developing countries can plan the volume of their exports, but, 
with rare exceptions, they cannot influence the price they receive. 
Thus there are also general grounds for feeling that price is the 
variable on which concerted international action were better 
concentrated. 
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EAST AFRICAN STUDIES No. 34 
Agricultural export 
development 
It is now widely accepted that the agricultural sector 
is of crucial importance in the economic development 
of East Africa. For the foreseeable future agriculture 
will be the only source of income for the majority of 
the population. Any plans to improve the living stand-
ards of the masses must therefore concern themselves 
with increasing agricultural productivity. In this 
radical study Yoeri Kyesimira brilliantly documents 
the key role ag^;ultural export development can play 
in capital formation in East Africa. He also shows that 
12 major agricultural commodities constitute about 
80% of East Africa's total value of exports and con-
cludes that there is an absolute necessity for the East 
African governments to adopt a strategy of diver-
sifying the range of agricultural exports. 
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